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1 Introduction
Politics is no laughing matter. And yet humour and laughter are such integral parts
of the political process. Humour provides a means for the public to come to terms with
political decisions, navigate dangerous political territory and spread political ideas. On
the other side of the coin, politicians can use humour to achieve many of their own
political goals, such as persuading opinion, gaining favour and diffusing tense situations.
Discourse, both written and spoken, is not only restricted to the use of words,
but also encompasses non-verbal elements such as body language, facial expressions,
intonation and even typesetting. Laughter can be used by politicians as a non-verbal
means of expressing opinion and making a statement without breaking the rules of
parliament. Furthermore, due to the spread of technology, the nature of political
debate is changing and non-verbal elements are becoming increasingly prevalent in
politics. This, coupled with the rising spread of populist extremist parties, which show
a general rejection of ‘traditional’ means of doing politics, is leading to fascinating
changes in the political landscape.
The aim of this thesis is to identify the use of laughter as a non-verbal means of
political communication in the German Bundestag by looking at the ways in which it
is used to show in-group membership and out-group dissent, while at the same time
allowing MPs to navigate the stringent rules in place that regulate the way they interact
with one another during the plenary sessions. To achieve this, the thesis is structured
as follows.
Chapter 2 will begin by looking at discourse analysis and situating political dis-
course and, more precisely, parliamentary debates within it. The characteristics spe-
cific to parliamentary debates, including interjections and non-verbal language will be
enumerated and described.
The second theoretical basis upon which this thesis stands draws from the theory
of humour. In Chapter 3, the concepts of humour and laughter will be broadly defined
before delving into the use of humour in a political context and conducting a review
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of some of the studies that have already been undertaken in the field of politics and
humour.
What follows will be an investigation of the use of laughter in the German Bundestag
as a non-verbal means of political communication. Following a short introduction,
in Chapter 4, into the area of study and a brief description of the specifics of the
German Bundestag that are relevant to this topic, several hypotheses will be posited
in Chapter 5 based on the theory outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Finally, in Chapter
6, the hypotheses will be analysed and discussed using the results of a data collection
that comprises 16,000 observations of laughter taken from the transcripts of 847 plenary
sessions spanning four electoral terms. The thesis will conclude with a reflection on
the methodology used and possible future applications.
2 Discourse analysis
While the origins of discourse analysis (DA) can be traced back more than 2000
years to the study of language and classical rhetoric, it wasn’t until the mid-1960s that
it really came into its stride. As a ‘cross-discipline’ or ‘trans-discipline’, it developed
alongside other interdisciplinary fields such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolin-
guistics, and pragmatics (van Dijk 1985; 2007).
Ullrich (2008) distinguishes two main branches of DA that developed on opposite
sides of the Atlantic. The first found inspiration in the works of French philosopher
Michel Foucault who, inspired by semiotics and (post-)structuralism, saw discourse as
a social practice. Far from being natural, discourse and language were considered pure
constructions of society that in turn shape concepts of reality and structures of power
(pp. 19-22). Kollmorgen (2015) provides a concise summary:
Damit transportieren Diskurse nicht nur Ideen oder Wissen, sondern erzeu-
gen es; sie dru¨cken nicht nur institutionelle Normen und Macht(ka¨mpfe)
aus, sondern realisieren und vera¨ndern sie; Diskurse folgen nicht nur bes-
timmten Subjektkonstitutionen oder -positionen, sie generieren diese mit
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und entwickeln sie. (p. 266)
The second branch took shape predominantly in the USA and English-speaking
world and was foremost used in sociolinguistics, conversation analysis, ethnomethodol-
ogy, pragmatics, political studies and sociology. Here, discourse was understood not as
a form of domination, but in the more traditional sense as the production of meaning
in text and talk (Kollmorgen, 2015, p. 265; Ullrich, 2008, pp. 23-24). Sociolinguis-
tics above all saw a shift away from macro-sociological approaches to social structure,
instead turning toward everyday social interaction at the micro-level and viewing lan-
guage use as a form of social interaction (van Dijk, 1985, p. 7).
Many new disciplines emerged simultaneously in the humanities and social sciences
between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, ranging from semiotics to pragmatics,
psycho- and sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking, conversation analysis and dis-
course studies. Although vastly different in terms of methodology and objects of study,
they all demonstrated several common elements. These included: an interest in ‘natu-
rally occurring’ language use by real language users; a shift from the study of isolated
words and sentences to texts, discourses, conversations or communicative events; a
movement away from grammar towards the study of action and interaction; an exten-
sion to non-verbal aspects of interaction and communication; and the study of the role
of the social, cultural and cognitive contexts of language use (van Dijk, 2007, p. xxi).
2.1 Political discourse analysis
Political discourse analysis has become a “more or less autonomous” sub-discipline
of discourse studies (van Dijk, 2007, p. xxvii). Defining the exact scope and nature of
political discourse, however, can be deceptively arduous. A first attempt is to define
it by its actors and authors, i.e. as the product of elected or appointed officials being
paid for their political activities. But political discourse, much like other forms of
discourse, is not performed in a closed space, but rather involves other participants.
Just as medical, legal and educational discourses do not only involve doctors, lawyers
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and teachers, but patients, defendants and students, the recipients of political discourse
must therefore also be taken into account. These include the voting public and citizens
(van Dijk, 1997, pp. 12-13). Indeed, addressivity is an essential component of discourse.
Addressees can range from immediate interlocutory partners to entire groups or even
an undefined other. The addressee, in turn, defines the composition and style of the
utterance and as such, the genre of the speech, which is made in anticipation of an
active response from the addressee(s) (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 94-100).
Furthermore, not every statement made by a politician can be considered political
discourse. A private conversation between two politicians about their plans for the
weekend, for example, could not be categorised as political discourse. Therefore, in
addition to looking at the actors and participants of political discourse, it is also neces-
sary to take into account the nature of the activities or practices of political discourse.
Political discourse can therefore be said to take place when political actors participate
in political actions, such as governing, ruling, legislating, protesting, dissenting, or
voting (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 13-14).
Finally, context plays a key role:
That is, politicians talk politically also (or only) if they and their talk are
contextualized in such communicative events such as cabinet meetings, par-
liamentary sessions, election campaigns, rallies, interviews with the media,
bureaucratic practices, protest demonstrations, and so on. Again, text and
context mutually define each other, in the sense that a session of parlia-
ment is precisely such only when elected politicians are debating (talking,
arguing, etc.) in parliament buildings in an official capacity (as MPs), and
during the official (officially opened) session of parliament.(van Dijk, 1997,
p. 14)
For example, while some types of discourse may be formally identical, they may
differ in the roles or status of the participants, the goals of the actors or the functions of
the interaction (e.g. interrogations could be of a legal, educational or political nature
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depending on the actors involved and the goals of the interaction) (van Dijk, 1997, p.
19).
Van Dijk (1997) identifies further categories to distinguish political discourse from
other forms of discourse. These include: societal domain or field; system; values;
institutions; actors; relations; action; and cognition. He suggests in future also adding
other categories such as time, location, buildings, and objects (pp. 16-19).
The preferred discourse structures and strategies of political discourse can further-
more be identified. These, according to van Dijk (1997), are:
Topics : Political discourse is overwhelmingly reflexive. This means that political
discourse will often be about politics, and political actions, processes and parties.
This is, however, not the full extent as political discourse combines these topics with
a potentially non-exhaustive list of other topics from other societal domains. For
example, a debate on immigration will not only be about political action such as
policies, but also about immigration. Political discourse tends to be future-oriented
and feature semantic polarisation (our positive actions vs their negative actions) (pp.
25-28).
Superstructures or textual schemata: In political discourse, the schematic distri-
bution of information is of particular importance. Here, certain information may be
placed in a prominent position, or conversely hidden behind other, less significant de-
tails in order to persuade listeners and support partisan goals. Each genre of political
discourse may furthermore display its own schematic structure, which may or may not
be obligatory (e.g. the opening and closing of official parliamentary sessions). Fore-
most in political discourse are the structures and strategies of argumentation (van Dijk,
1997, pp. 29-30).
Local semantics : Beyond the prototypical meanings of political discourse (about
politicians, political institutions, organisations, actors and actions, decisions, politi-
cians, etc.) are expressions of partisan polarisation. Here our group is referred to
in more positive terms than their group and our good deeds are made explicit and
described in detail, while our bad deeds tend to be implicit and referred to only indi-
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rectly or vaguely. The opposite approach is used when referring to their group. Further
strategies involve conditional and functional coherence to reinforce politically biased
explanations of social and political facts (for example, blaming minority unemploy-
ment on the inability of minorities to perform and not on employer discrimination).
Other functional relations include generalisation, specification, contrast and example
(e.g. specifying and generalising the bad deeds of their party and backing this up with
examples); contrast is used to reinforce the polarisation between them and us (van
Dijk, 1997, pp. 30-33).
Lexicon: On a lexical level, the same partisan polarisation is expressed. Their
actions are described in more negative terms, while our negative aspects are described
using euphemisms. Examples of this include pairings such as terrorists vs freedom
fighters, and civilian killings vs ‘collateral damage’ (van Dijk, 1997, p. 33).
Syntax : The political manipulation of syntactic style involves the “use of pronouns,
variations of word order, the use of specific syntactic categories, active and passive
constructions, nominalisations, clause embedding, sentence complexity and other ways
to express underlying meanings in sentence structures” (van Dijk, 1997, p. 33). The
use of certain pronouns serves functions of exclusion and inclusion e.g. us vs them or
‘we the people’. Word order can be manipulated to emphasise or mitigate facts by,
for example, placing certain words in prominent positions or deciding on the active or
passive voice to deflect responsible agency (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 33-34).
Rhetoric: Rhetoric generally has a persuasive function in political discourse. Polit-
ical rhetoric can be described as typically verbose and hyperbolic. It largely features
repetition as a means of drawing attention to preferred meanings and functioning as
a memorisation aid. Euphemisms, litotes and hyperboles are used to accentuate the
good work of our party while downplaying any negative aspects and vice versa for
the opposition. Irony, metonymy and metaphor are used again for reasons of partisan
polarisation by, for example, referring to our politicians as lions, tigers or bears and
theirs as foxes, hyenas or rats (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 34-36).
Expression structures : These include prosodic features such as volume, pitch, and
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intonation as well as graphical features such as letter type, and the use of colours or
photographs. Much like the other elements described above, expression structures also
serve partisan goals by emphasising preferred meanings (loud voice, bold lettering) and
downplaying undesirable meanings (van Dijk, 1997, p. 36).
Speech acts and interaction: Different speech acts are preferred in different genres
of political discourse. Parliamentary debates, for example, typically feature assertions,
questions, accusations or apologies, while government declarations are, for the most
part, assertive. Accusations may show dissent, while excuses may be used to defend
certain negatively perceived actions. In terms of interaction, political dialogue has the
features of verbal interaction including turn allocation and appropriation. Applause
may add a further interactive element (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 36-37). According to Fair-
clough (1994), public and political discourse is beginning to display a growing number
of features of conversational language in a process he terms ‘the conversationalization
of public discourse’. This includes colloquial vocabulary; phonic, prosodic and paralin-
guistic features of colloquial language; modes of grammatical complexity characteristic
of colloquial spoken language; colloquial modes of topical development; and colloquial
genres (p. 242). More detail will be provided on this in section 2.2.3.
2.2 Parliamentary debates
Parliamentary debates are a genre of political discourse. Other genres of political
discourse include political speeches, policy documents, political manifestos, bills, laws,
media interviews, political talk shows, and government regulations (van Dijk, 1997,
p. 18). This list is, however, far from exhaustive and, as van Dijk (2007) writes,
“The number of discourse types hardly ever studied is probably much bigger than the
discourse types that have been studied” (p. xxviii). This, according to Bakhtin (1986),
is due to the inexhaustible nature of human activity and the associated speech genres
that continue to grow as the activity becomes more complex (p. 60).
The same problems that plague the distinction of political discourse from other
forms of discourse are also present when it comes to defining parliamentary debates.
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The line between these and other genres of political discourse is blurry at best. Again
structure alone (topic, forms of rhetoric, argumentation) does not suffice in determining
the genre as these elements can be shared with many other genres of discourse. Context
(MPs, political parties, government and opposition, constituents and voters, political
goals and processes, and knowledge and ideologies) must also be taken into account
when defining genres of political discourse (van Dijk, 2007, p. xxvii).
Below is a categorisation of parliamentary debates according to van Dijk (1997):
Figure 1: Categorisation of parliamentary debates
Source: van Dijk, 2007, p. 19.
Parliamentary debates display certain characteristics such as “formal address, con-
trolled turn-allocation, strict time management, and the interaction between govern-
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ment party speakers and those of the opposition” (van Dijk, 2000, p. 89). They are
governed by rules and norms that vary from country to country (van Dijk, 2010, p. 42).
Parliamentary discourse is ritualised and rule-bound, multivoiced (MPs respond not
only to what has been said in the house, but elsewhere) and fundamentally adversarial
(Bayley, 2004, pp. 14-24). Finally, parliamentary discourse is “made up of a series
of monologues all addressing the same question. But the nature of the discourse is
not monologic but dialogic” (Bayley, 2004, p. 25). This monologic, dialogic or possi-
bly even trialogic nature of parliamentary discourse will be addressed in section 2.2.2.
Parliamentary debates can be further reduced into sub-genres including speeches and
interpellations (Ilie, 2010, p. 9).
2.2.1 According to Klein
German linguist and former MP Josef Klein (2014) provides his own definition of
political discourse and parliamentary debates. He begins his theory by rejecting the
terms ‘speaker’ and ‘author’, as they imply texts of either an oral or written nature.
Instead he opts for a term proposed by Glinz (1977), that of Emittent . The key
categories for describing text types (TS), according to Klein, are Emittent , Adressat
and kummunikative Grundfunktion. These are very similar to van Dijk’s actor, recipient
and goal. Klein also advocates the use of further categories for a more in-depth analysis
of the text type that correspond broadly with those of van Dijk including pragmatic,
semantic, grammatical, and rhetorical categories (pp. 151-159). These categories are
outlined below:
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Figure 2: Categories for analysing text types
Source: Klein, 2014, p. 157.
Klein (2014) distinguishes different types of political texts based on the role of
the Emittent . This leads to the creation of six main text types of which there are
numerous subcategories. These are text types emitted by: 1) the parliament; 2) the
government; 3) parties/parliamentary groups; 4) politicians; 5) external groups; and
6) unspecified. Of interest to the current study is the fourth type—texts emitted by
politicians. Here further distinction is made between written and spoken texts. For this
study, spoken texts are of relevance. These are further broken down into formal speech
acts, which include questions and interjections (more information will be provided on
interjections in section 2.2.3), and political speeches. Klein defines political speeches
as bound to political institutions, and made by an elected or appointed political official
about political topics. The category of political speeches is in turn further reduced to
dissent-oriented and consensus-oriented speeches (pp. 160-196). Figure 3 provides a
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visual representation of this categorisation for ease of comprehension.
Parliament
Government
Parties/
Parliamentary	groups
Politicians
Written
Spoken
Formal	speech	acts
Political	speech
Dissent-oriented
Political	
debate	speeches
Party	debate
speeches
Parliamentary	
debate	speechesConsensus-
oriented
External	groups
Unspecified
Figure 3: Political text types
Source: Klein, 2014, pp. 160-196.
Within dissent-oriented political speeches are political debate speeches. The reason
Klein (2014) reduces political debates to the level of the individual speeches is because
there are many Emittent in a debate. “Dementsprechend ist nicht die Debatte, wohl
aber die Debattenrede eine TS” (p. 152). Political speech in parliamentary democracies
is characterised by conflict and parliamentary debates are no exception. The conflictual
nature of debate speeches lies in the fact that they are made in front of an opponent
who is present, who also possesses the right to make a speech (providing speaking time
has been accordingly allocated), and who may ask questions or make interjections at
any time (Klein, 2014, p. 184).
Klein (2014) breaks political debate speeches into two further sub-categories: party
debate speeches and parliamentary debate speeches. The former he characterises as
part of a decision-making process, while the latter are part of a process of legitimisation.
While both forms may be persuasive in nature, their goals are vastly different. It
is during party debate speeches that the real decisions are made as speakers try to
convince other party members and delegates present to vote in favour of their own
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positions. Here an earnest attempt is made to convince those present to vote a certain
way. Because all decisions have thus been made prior to the parliamentary debate,
the second form of political debate is purely an exercise in legitimisation. The goal
of parliamentary debates is therefore not to convince the other MPs present, but to
above all convince the public that the right decisions have been made (pp. 184-186).
Party debates therefore require a certain level of seriousness, while parliamentary
debates are often viewed as a mock battle. This is also true at a lexical level, where,
during the party debate, words must be carefully chosen, divisive meanings avoided
and we is used to include both the supporting as well as the opposing parties. The
opposite is true during the parliamentary debate. As the goal of the debate is not to
change the opinion of the opposing parties (which has already been determined), being
rude to the opposition is likely to receive a positive reaction from the speaker’s own
party (pp. 185-186).
2.2.2 Parliamentary discourse as monologue, dialogue or trialogue?
The pre-structured nature of debates in the contemporary Bundestag and the fact
that decisions are made long in advance behind the closed doors of the party rooms
have caused parliamentary debates to lose meaning and interest in the plenary cham-
ber. This, coupled with the ever growing importance of the media and the image
politicians present to the public, means that debates are no longer being taken seri-
ously (Burkhardt, 1995, pp. 103-104).
Burkhardt identifies seven different forms of parliament over the more than 150-year
history of German parliamentarism. These range from Diskussionsparlament (1848/49)
to Scheinparlament (1933-45) and Akklamationsparlament (Volkskammer 1949-89). He
categorises the current form of parliament as a democratic Parteien- oder Schaufen-
sterparlament . This form of ‘for show’ parliamentarism is characterised by its ‘staged’
debates, which no longer serve as a means of convincing the opposing party, but of le-
gitimising already made decisions. (Burkhardt, 2003, pp. 5-7). This corresponds with
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Klein’s (2014) definition of parliamentary debates, according to which, “Debattenreden
im Parlamentsplenum haben normalerweise keine Chance, vor der Entscheidung noch
Stimmen zu bewegen” (p. 185). Therefore parliamentary debates are less an act of
persuasion and more an act for the media and the public.
According to Ku¨hn (1983),
Parlamentsdebatten werden von den Akteuren so inszeniert, dass die Oef-
fentlichkeit den Eindruck gewinnt, es handele sich um eine rationale, argu-
mentative Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ziel des politischen Konsensus, in
Wirklichkeit mu¨ssen diese Debatten in der Regel als Zeremonie zur Recht-
fertigung vorab festgelegter Positionen angesehen werden. (p. 242)
The structure of parliamentary debate speeches is also an interesting one. Although
they are of a somewhat dialogical nature, parliamentary debates can be considered as
asymmetrical communication (Ku¨hn, 1983, p. 241). The Chair gives an MP the floor
and the MP may then speak for an allocated period during which time the other MPs
are ideally not allowed to interrupt. Speeches are thus monologically constructed.
However, the asymmetry of the speech can be compensated for in several ways: other
MPs who are subsequently given the right to speak may address comments made
previously or may, during another MPs speech, use verbal or non-verbal forms of
communication (applause, laughter, interjections etc.) to address what is being said
(Burkhardt, 2004, pp. 148-149).
According to Burkhardt (2004), the real addressees of speeches in the Bundestag are
not the other MPs in the plenary chamber, but citizens watching on TV, listening on
the radio or reading about the events in the newspaper. These people are often unaware
that the speeches are actually addressed to them (p. 146). Dieckmann (1981) therefore
proposes using the term ‘trialogue’ to refer to a form of communication that has two
addressees (individuals or groups) to whom the speaker has a different relationship (as
cited in Ku¨hn, 1983, p. 242). Interestingly, though, a trialogic discourse is structured
as a dialogue, often to the extent that the third group of addressees is neglected and
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as such, is frequently unaware of the role they play in the communication (Burkhardt,
1995, pp. 78-79). Truan (2016), in her categorisation of parliamentary interjections,
identifies the other MPs as addressees of speeches in parliament, while the public are
the target recipients (p. 131).
2.2.3 Interjections as parliamentary discourse
Parliaments are highly ritualised, highly conventionalised institutions. The dis-
course that takes place within them is governed by traditions, rules and regulations
(Bayley, 2004, p. 14). Due to the highly structured, conventionalised nature of parlia-
ments,
MPs have been developing and using a wide variety of strategic, and even
subversive, mechanisms to challenge and bypass some of these very norms
and regulations, when they are perceived to be anachronistic and counter-
productive in the context of free parliamentary debates. (Ilie, 2010, p. 2)
Interjections are a means of bypassing these stringent regulations. Although the
Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag explicitly state that only the President
of the Bundestag may give an MP permission to speak (Rule 27), thus casting doubt
on the very presence of interjections in parliament, Rule 119 calls for every interjection
to be made an “integral part of the minutes of plenary proceedings unless it is deleted
with the consent of the President and those concerned” (p. 92). A similar case can
be found in Israel where, despite being prohibited in the Knesset Rules of Procedure,
“interruptions and heckling have become an accepted part of Israeli parliamentarism”
(Shenhav, 2008, p. 228). The allocation of time during a debate is strictly regulated
and fiercely fought over and for MPs who feel they have not received their just allocation
of time, there remains (outside of asking questions, for which the speaker still retains
the power to decide whether to accept to answer or ignore the question) interjecting
as the only means of expressing an opinion unhindered by rules and free from form
(Kipke, 1995, p. 111).
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While interjections can be found in most areas of communication, their form and
frequency vary according to text type. There is a vast difference, for instance, be-
tween interjecting during an academic conference and interjecting during a talk show
(Burkhardt, 2004, p. 2). Kipke (1995) distinguishes between political and non-political
functions of interjections. Among the non-political are personal insults, usually as a
reaction to an attack from a political opponent and as a means to retaliate when
the MP has not been allocated speaking time. Further interjections are provocative
interjections purely intended to interrupt, and interjections as a sign of fatigue and
boredom, which tend to arise after hours of listening to well-known arguments. On
the other hand are interjections of a political nature. These are used to encourage or
unsettle the speaker and as such strengthen the interjector’s own party while devaluing
the opposition party (pp. 110-111).
Burkhardt (2004) distinguishes six categories of interjections. Memoranda are inter-
jections that are used to remind the speaker that they have overlooked an important
argument or forgotten an important detail in their reasoning. These often contain
irony, mockery and/or criticism. Affirmativa are forms of agreement such as ‘Bravo’
‘Sehr wahr’ and ‘Ho¨rt, ho¨rt’, most commonly used for in-group members, or ironically
for members of the opposition. Erotetika are earnest questions such as ‘When?’ or
‘Who wrote that?’ that truly seek to gain extra information. Among all the types
of interjection, these appear comparatively seldom. Direktiva are orders that can also
be ironic or derisive. Dissentiva are used to reject an idea or argument and are often
noted in the stenographic record as ‘Widerspruch bei’. Evaluativa are accusations and
above all accusations of lying (pp. 310-385).
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Interjections
Memoranda
Affirmativa
Erotetika
Direktiva
Dissentiva
Evaluativa
Figure 4: Categorisation of interjections
Source: Burkhardt, 2004, pp. 310-385.
Truan (2016) defines interjections as syntactically autonomous and semantically
complete communicative events. Interjections are a sub-category of interruptions and
can act as approval markers. Using a corpus comprising eighteen parliamentary de-
bates at the German Bundestag between 1998 and 2015, she finds that, contrary to
expectation, interjections as approval markers tend not to be directed towards in-group
members, but towards members of the opposition, with 43% of interjections directed
towards members of the in-group, compared to 57% directed towards the opposition.
She attributes this, however, to the use of irony and does not reject the idea that
interjections serve to reinforce in-group identity.
Contrary to Truan’s observations, Burkhardt (2004) finds that interjections that
mark approval (affirmativa) are above all used for in-group members. When, however,
they are used for members of the opposition, it is mainly in the form of irony or as a
counter-attack (pp. 342-343). Furthermore, as plenary debates become less relevant for
actual decision-making processes, the use of interjections has increased dramatically,
both in terms of overall quantity and length. These serve often to ridicule the speaker
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through the use of irony or mockery (Burkhardt, 2004, pp. 621-622).
Because of changes in the nature of the parliament, the nature of interjections during
plenary sessions has drastically changed over time: from a simple form of agreement or
disagreement in the Reichstag and Weimarer Nationalversammlung to an independent
speech indicating points of disagreement as well as irony and humour (Burkhardt, 1995,
p. 80; 2004, pp. 621-622). Decisions in Schaufensterparlamente are made in advance,
effectively reducing debates to mere stage performances. This causes the MPs to
quickly become disinterested and the activity to lose its seriousness. Hoinle (2001)
finds that, over time, this lack of interest has led to more ridiculous interjections from
the MPs (p. 448) and Burkhardt (1995) notes that this has resulted in less discussion
and more interruption (pp. 103-104).
Due to the trialogic nature of parliamentary speech, interjections (both verbal and
non-verbal) have become an indispensible tool in the politician’s toolkit and a means of
obstructing the public presentation of the politician. Ku¨hn (1983) looks at interjections
in the German Bundestag and, in particular, the statement “there is no Minister here”,
which is produced when a Minister, instead of attending in person, sends a stand-in
to participate in a parliamentary debate. He finds that because the interjection points
out an already observed and obvious fact, the interjection can in fact be considered
a form of staged communication that is addressed to multiple recipients. Here the
MP tries to call out the government for not being interested in the topic at hand and
therefore sending a replacement. The interjector makes a party political advertisement
by effectively calling the ruling government incapable (pp. 242-247).
Finally, Shenhav (2008) looks at proceedings from the Israeli Knesset and finds
that the opposition made considerably more interjections during speeches by Prime
Minister Rabin than the coalition members did during speeches by the leader of the
opposition (p. 231). The above section has shown that despite being often overlooked
in the literature on political discourse, interjections play a crucial role in political
communication and can act as an effective means of gauging the political climate.
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2.3 Non-verbal communication
Non-verbal communication, in conjunction with verbal language, is a means of hu-
man interaction. For non-verbal communication to work, the communicators need to
share common codes and recognise the intentions of the other (Payrato, 2009, p. 165).
Non-verbal communication can be difficult to define, the term itself merely indicating
what it is not, rather than what it is. Generally speaking, non-verbal communica-
tion exists in addition to language and can be broken down into two broad categories:
kinesics, which are visual elements such as gestures or facial expressions; and paralan-
guage or vocal (non-verbal) communication (Payrato, 2009, pp. 163-167). The latter
category can be further broken down into voice qualifiers (whisper, breathy, husky) and
voice qualifications (laugh, giggle, cry) (Crystal, 1969, p. 177) also known as non-verbal
vocalisations (Trouvain & Truong, 2012) or non-lexical sounds (Ward, 2006).
Non-verbal vocalisations are more likely to occur in conversational speech than other
more controlled speaking situations and can be further reduced to vegetative sounds
and affect sounds. The former include involuntary sounds such as snoring, chewing,
coughing and sneezing as well as deliberate sounds such throat clearing (e.g. to signal
‘I am here’), while the latter include laughing, cheering, weeping and screaming (Trou-
vain, 2014, p. 598). Vegetative sounds for the most part do not have a paralinguistic
character, but can nonetheless convey extra-linguistic information about the speaker
(coughing or sneezing can, for example, indicate the level of health of the speaker). Af-
fective sounds, on the other hand, can convey a lot of information about the speaker’s
attitudes and feelings in a very short amount of time (Trouvain & Truong, 2012, p.
37).
An investigation of six different corpora of conversational English found that laugh-
ter and breathing noises are the most frequently used forms of non-verbal vocalisations
(Trouvain & Truong, 2012). Laughter, however, also has characteristics that allow it to
be distinguished from other non-verbal sounds. It can, for example, take on the status
of an official conversational activity. When reporting on prior conversation, laughter
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can be given as a response to a quoted utterance, as for example ‘I said X and he
laughed’ (Jefferson, Sacks, & Schegloff, 1987, p. 156).
3 Humour
The second theoretical basis upon which this thesis stands draws from studies in
humour and the role that humour and, in particular, laughter play in communication
and interaction, first on a more general level, and then restricted to the realm of politics.
German philosophical anthropologist Helmut Plessner (1941) believed that laughing
and crying are two actions exclusive to man. Laughter creates a rift between mind and
body, the latter no longer controllable by the former, causing the laugher to shake
uncontrollably to the point of breathlessness (as cited in Do¨rner, 2017, pp. 17-18).
Three main theories of laughter and humour can be distinguished throughout his-
tory. The first and oldest theory is the ‘Superiority Theory’, which includes advocates
such as Plato, the Bible, and Thomas Hobbes. They found the loss of self-control
caused by laughter to be undesirable, the sign of a poorly regulated soul, and a lack
of personal dignity and self-mastery. According to them, humour and laughter are
evidence of aggression and hostility and a means of expressing feelings of superiority.
However, certain proponents of this theory also saw the power of laughter as a social
corrective. Being laughed at may be humiliating, but it can act as a means to alter
undesirable behaviour (Morreall, 2009, pp. 4-9).
The second theory, the ‘Incongruity Theory’ counted among its proponents names
such as James Beattie, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, and Arthur Schopenhauer.
These thinkers were less interested in social hierarchies and conflicts and more keen
to find the cause of laughter and humour. Key to this theory is the idea of mental
patterns based on experience. When these patterns are violated, laughter may ensue
(Morreall, 2009, pp. 9-15). According to Morreall (2009), “Amusement is being struck
by the mismatch between a concept and a perception of the same thing, and enjoying
the mental jolt that gives us” (p. 12).
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The third theory, the ‘Relief Theory’, focuses on the physical phenomenon of laugh-
ter. With its foundations in eighteenth century medical science, laughter was thought
to release the pressure in the nervous system caused by the build-up of ‘animal spirits’
in much the same way as a pressure relief valve. Here laughter is no longer seen as
anti-social or irrational, but merely a means of letting off steam. Freud believed in the
power of laughter as a form of relief, arguing that laughter releases psychic energy that
would normally be used to repress feelings (Morreall, 2009, pp. 15-23).
Although not included among the main theories of humour, a fourth theory pro-
posed by Aristotle and revived by Thomas Aquinas can be added to the list. It saw
humour as a form of playful relaxation allowing humans to occasionally rest from seri-
ous activity (Morreall, 2009, pp. 23-24).
3.1 Humour in politics
Parliamentary humour is usually described as a means of expressing criti-
cism and aggression in a mitigated and socially acceptable manner, namely
without violating parliamentary rules of conduct. (Archakis & Tsakona,
2011, p. 63)
There are many reasons why politicians would resort to humorous discourse. Infor-
mal discourse is “employed by politicians in their attempt to create a more personalised
view of political affairs, hide the unequal distribution of discursive resources along dif-
ferent social groups, and avoid political argumentation” (Archakis & Tsakona, 2011,
p. 62). Do¨rner (2017) finds that, although humour can have a significant positive
effect on the public‘s impression of a politician, the use of humour can also be fraught
with danger. Use too much and the politician appears unserious; use too little and the
politician comes across as uptight und unapproachable. Used right, however, humour
can be a very powerful tool in political communication (pp. 36-38).
Do¨rner (2017) delineates the political macro-functions of comedy and laughter as
follows:
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Inclusion	and	exclusion
•Weaken	the	opposing	argument	and	strengthen	own.
Attack	and	criticism
•On	an	individual	level	as	'comic	relief'.
•On	a	societal	level,	satire	and	criticism	can	act	as	a	vent	even	in	
non-democratic	countries.	Laughter	takes	some	of	the	pressure	
away	and	can	prevent	criticism	from	ending	in	change.
Letting	off	steam
•A	punchline	can	make	something	apparent	immediately.	As	this	
understanding	is	associated	with	positive	feelings,	the	knowledge	
remains	longer	in	the	mind.
Understanding	and	comprehension
•The	politician	is	received	positively.
Amusement
Figure 5: Political macro-functions of comedy and laughter
Source: Do¨rner 2017, p.p.29-34.
Here it can be seen that the three main theories of humour are present in Do¨rner’s
macro-functions of comedy and laughter as well as further ones such as inclusion and
exclusion, and understanding and comprehension. Contrary to what the proponents
of the ‘Superiority Theory’ believed, humour does not only serve negative functions,
but can have positive effects as well. Furthermore, it can be persuasive and act as a
memory aid.
According to Hoinle (2003), laughter serves several political functions: as a means of
creating and reinforcing in-group relations; as a political weapon when used to laugh
at other politicians; as a means of diffusing otherwise tense situations by reducing
aggression and acting as a relief mechanism by creating a common ground (laughter);
as a non-verbal means of creating messages, making meaning, and showing opinion and
intention; as a means to incite criticism by unmasking hidden views and rationalising
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tense situations; as a stabiliser; and as a means of social control (p. 4).
Folglich ist Lachen, auch wenn es vordergru¨ndig weder dem Ernst der poli-
tischen Sache noch der Wu¨rde eines Hohen Hauses angemessen scheint, fu¨r
Prozesse der Gruppenbildung und Kommunikation in einem Parlament von
nicht unwesentlicher Bedeutung. (Hoinle, 2001, p. 441)
3.2 The study of humour in politics
Many studies have been conducted to examine the role that humour plays in politics
and parliament. Perhaps most pertinent to this thesis is an investigation into the use
of Lachen and Heiterkeit in the German parliament.
Mu¨ller (2011) looks at Bundestag proceedings from November 1994 – December
2006 and finds that MPs tend more often to laugh at (noted as Lachen in the tran-
scripts) other politicians than with them (noted as Heiterkeit in the transcripts). His
study shows 7529 instances of Lachen compared to 7424 instances of Heiterkeit.
Mu¨ller finds that Lachen can serve several purposes: as a rebuttal (without needing
to enter into an argument, making the serious non-serious); as ironic interpretation (to
undermine the effect of what is said); as denigration (to exclude out-group members
and strengthen in-group relations); and as social control (as a response to inappropriate
behaviour, in his example a drunk MP) (p. 41).
He attributes Heiterkeit to several causes: the negotiation of time limits; the viola-
tion of expectations and regulations; the use of formal language vs informal language;
teasing about parliamentary habits; inappropriate behaviour and linguistic lapses; ver-
bal humour; and reactions to funny repartee (p. 42).
He finds that laughter is distributed along party and coalition lines and can act as
a means of criticising the opposition while marking in- and out-group adherence.
Tsakona and Popa (2011) look at humour in politics and find evidence that all
three theories of humour are at play in political contexts. Humour allows politicians
to criticise their opponents while adhering to the norms of politeness and avoiding
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rude behaviour. It also occurs in settings where serious communication is expected,
e.g. in parliament, political debate, interviews, etc. leading to a mismatch between
expectation and reality. They furthermore see the potential of humour as a means
of letting off steam and quieting rebellion in both democratic and non-democratic
countries.
Archakis and Tsakona (2011) look at the use of humour in a Greek parliamentary
setting and find that politicians use humour to negatively evaluate their opponents and
present themselves as capable of speaking the “language of common people” (p. 63).
Humour can also be used as a means of evaluation or criticism and humorous narratives
can contribute to in-group bonding and enable interlocutors to confirm common views,
values and norms (Archakis & Tsakona, 2011, p. 64-65).
In Greece, as in many other Western nations, parliamentary debate is broadcast to
the public. According to the authors, Greek politicians aim
not to provide political and legal arguments on the issues discussed in par-
liament [...] [but rather to] address a wider audience using a familiar (i.e.
everyday and conversational) mode in order to attract the attention of the
public and persuade them that their policies are right, that their criticism
is justified, and that they have something better to propose than their
opponents. (Archakis & Tsakona, 2011, p. 67)
In the US, Yarwood (2006) finds that, despite expectations that the use of humour
in the United States Congress would be of a combative nature, the humour used is
actually more self-effacing than ridiculing. It is used to create bonds with colleagues,
and attract more attention to the speeches being made. There are, however, a certain
number of risks such as not being taken seriously, or having a joke misunderstood or
taken out of context.
The use of humour in politics is not only a recent phenomenon. Anotoine de
Baecque (1997) looks at over 28 months of parliamentary records from 1789-91 in the
French Constitutional Assembly and counts 48 distinct incidents of laughter. According
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to him, “Laughter was, exceptionally, authorized because it restored order and injected
a dose of humility, and it served as a natural antidote to the ‘hybris’ of men in power”
(de Baecque, 1997, p. 184). He found that, although prohibited in the internal code
of conduct, laughter, like applause, murmurs and boos, acted as a means of showing
partisan belonging (de Baecque, 1997, p. 196).
Ilie (2004) looks at parliamentary insults in the British and Swedish parliaments
and finds that the unparliamentary language used shows a range of institution-specific
and culture-specific differences. In Britain insults are, to a greater extent, based on
emotion, while in Sweden they are based on morals and values. Insults serve in-group
identity and out-group dissent, although British MPs tend to focus their insults on
personality differences while Swedish MPs focus on ideology-related differences. British
MPs are likely to answer an insult with another insult, while Swedish MPs chastise the
insulter. The study demonstrates that the use of insults is culturally defined.
Ornatowski (2010) looks at the ways in which certain verbal and non-verbal be-
haviours of Polish MPs changed following the political transition of 1989. The Pol-
ish written parliamentary record also contains recordings of instances of “applause,
laughter, backchanneling, commotion in the chamber, hitting the pulpit, demonstra-
tive leaving and entering, and other verbal and non-verbal behaviours of MPs” (p.
226). Ornatowski (2010) finds that following the transition in Poland in 1989 from
‘real socialism’ to parliamentary democracy, politicians began to behave differently in
parliament, displaying a range of behaviours including interrupting, using colloquial
speech, laughing, arguing and generally speaking at a higher volume. Prior to the
transition, parliament was seen as a serious affair and laughter was strikingly absent
from official political life. This rapidly changed under the new system. In terms of the
role humour played in parliament, Ornatowski (2010) finds that, in the beginning, hu-
mour served a more therapeutic function most commonly resulting from juxtapositions
of the old and the new political systems. This was peppered with a few instances of
humour with an integrating-differentiating function, separating opposition MPs from
MPs representing the former ruling coalition. After 2001, humour was mainly used
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for entertainment purposes as well as to serve two other major functions: integrating
political allies and demeaning political opponents.
Further west, Hoinle (2001) looks at debates in the German Bundestag and the dif-
ferent functions humour plays in political discourse. Surprisingly, however, he doesn’t
actually distinguish between Lachen and Heiterkeit as noted in the plenary transcripts,
but instead creates his own nomenclatures. The first category he distinguishes is gen-
eral amusement such as results from a joke, fun between colleagues or the all important
time call. It can help to release tension and improve attention. Amusement that is not
politically coded creates a community spirit in the parliament. Unintended amusement
is caused by a slip of the tongue, while induced amusement can be used to reinforce an
argument—“Wer die Lacher auf seiner Seite weiß, partizipiert an der U¨berlegenheit der
Lachenden und braucht letztendlich weniger Argumente vorzuweisen” (Hoinle, 2001,
p. 445)—or to disguise an attack. If the opponent gets upset, it can be claimed that
the statement was merely a joke and the opponent lacks a sense of humour. Offensive
amusement is a weapon that can be used by the opposition to show that they are ready
to fight, while at the same time reducing the distance between them and the ruling
party. In doing so, however, they show their own powerlessness. The ruling party, on
the other hand, tries to make the opposition appear ridiculous. Defensive amusement
is used to refute criticism and stake and defend claims. It not only reinforces group
identity, but it creates a barrier between the opponent and their claims (Hoinle, 2001,
pp. 442-449).
Finally, laughter is a non-verbal means of argumentation that helps to form in-
groups while also fulfilling a communicative function by rejecting certain statements
and making the laugher’s own opinion clear.
In den verschiedenen Situationenen kommen die beiden Gesichter des Lachens
zum Vorschein: es bildet Gruppen und grenzt zugleich aus, es greift an und
verteidigt, es ta¨uscht und enthu¨llt, es stiftet sowohl Unruhe als auch Ord-
nung, es entspannt und bedroht, es deklassiert und erhebt, es vereinnahmt
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und motiviert. (Hoinle, 2001, p. 449)
Hoinle (2001) finds that not only members of the same party laugh together, but
former, potential or current coalition partners as well. In his study, the PDS was the
sole exception as not only did the other parties not laugh with the PDS, but they rarely
laughed at the PDS either. This helped to reinforce its identity as an outsider party
and the PDS was found to mainly laugh at attacks on itself or its history.
Sebaldt (1995) also turns his attention to outsider parties and looks at the verbal
tactics used in the 12th Bundestag to exclude the PDS, a new party in the Bundestag
at that time, following German reunification. The PDS was a successor to the SED,
the ruling party of the former East Germany and a party that was considered anti-
democratic. In total, he analyses 5820 pages of parliamentary transcripts from 67
plenary sessions covering the entire year of 1991. He finds that 76.1% of all uses of
verbal exclusionary tactics can be traced back to the CDU/CSU followed by the FDP
with 19.6%. This he rationalises by the fact that the CDU/CSU and the FDP were
not only the furthest from the PDS on the political spectrum but also made up the
coalition government at the time, which was the main target of any criticism from the
PDS. Sebaldt furthermore finds that over time the PDS was decreasingly a victim of
marginalisation as the other parties grew used to its presence.
Although not entirely restricted to the sphere of politics, Pullin (2011) also conducts
a study that looks at the integrative and divisive nature of humour. She looks at the use
of humour in the workplace and finds that it can play a vital role in power relations
and in-group integration. On the one hand, humour can be used to integrate new
staff members into the team by creating an in-group feeling, while on the other hand,
humour can help to break down and contest power roles. Here she distinguishes two
outcomes of humour in leadership roles: solidarity and power. Humour can help to
foster a ‘them vs us’ dichotomy and subversive humour can have a challenging as well as
solidarity effect that can reinforce in-group status by excluding ‘outsiders’. Subversive
humour stands in contrast to supportive humour.
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4 Background
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the use of laughter in the German Bundestag.
Before a complete analysis can be undertaken, certain characteristics of the German
parliament need to be described. The following section will deal with aspects of the
Bundestag relevant to this study.
4.1 The German Bundestag
The Bundestag, together with the Bundesrat, makes up the legislative branch of the
German political system. Its members are voted in every four years either directly as
representatives of one of Germany’s 299 constituencies or from a party list put forward
in each federal state.
With the exception of the third Bundestag from 1957 to 1961, no single party has
ever won an absolute majority. This means that a coalition must be formed in order
to guarantee a majority of seats in the parliament. There are a number of ways to
achieve this, ranging from:
• A grand coalition (große Koalition) whereby the two parties with the greatest
number of votes form a coalition;
• A small coalition (kleine Koalition), the most common form of coalition whereby
one of the two main parties forms a coalition with one or more smaller parties;
• A minority government (Minderheitsregierung) where the governing coalition
does not hold the majority of the seats; and
• A national unity government (Allparteienkoalition), which has yet to occur in
Germany, where all parties join to form a government (Feldkamp & Stro¨bel,
2005, p. 296).
In order to form a coalition, parties must come together to agree on the terms of
their coalition.
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The length of time it takes to form a government can be used as an indication
of how difficult the coalition negotiations were. If this period of time is considered
to begin on the day of the elections and continue until the cabinet is sworn in, the
following table shows how long negotiations took for the four periods comprised in this
study.
Period	 16th	 17th	 18th	 19th	
Time	 65	days	 31	days	 86	days	 171	days	
	
Table 1: Time taken to form a coalition by period
Source: Feldkamp & Stro¨bel, 2005, Chapter 6.7, updated 14.12.2018.
Speaking time for the plenary sessions is allocated based on the proportional size of
the parties, among other factors. The exact distribution of time is agreed at the start
of each electoral term and no individual speaker may have the floor for more than 15
minutes, unless additional time is requested in advance (Feldkamp & Stro¨bel, 2005, p.
419; Strasser & Sobolewski, 2019, p. 64).
The distribution of speaking time for the four periods comprised in this study is
illustrated in the following figure :
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CDU/CSU 19
SPD 19
FDP 8
DIE LINKE 7
B90/DIE 
GRÜNEN
7
16th Bundestag
CDU/CSU 23
SPD 14
FDP 9
DIE LINKE 7
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GRÜNEN
7
17th Bundestag
CDU/CSU 27
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18th Bundestag
CDU/CSU
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SPD
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FDP
7
DIE LINKE
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6
19th Bundestag
Figure 6: Allocated speaking time for each period by party, in minutes per hour
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (2007); Deutscher Bundestag (2010); Deutscher Bundestag (2014a);
Deutscher Bundestag (2019).
4.2 Stenographic reports
Although the use of stenography “hat sich zu allen Zeiten und in allen La¨ndern
geltend gemacht, wo die freie Rede ma¨chtig auf die Geschicke des Staates einwirkte”
(Conn, 1871, p. 1), in modern times the written transcription of parliamentary de-
bates can be traced back to mid-eighteenth century England. France followed suit not
long after and Germany began using stenographic services in parliament in the early
nineteenth century (Burkhardt, 2003, p. 458; Klein, 1989, p. 975).
According to the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag, a stenographic
record must be made of each plenary session. All speakers receive a two-hour window
in which to review the transcript of their speech and make corrections while paying
careful attention that their changes do not alter the meaning of the speech or parts
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thereof (Rules 116–118). According to Olschewski (2000), this leaves only room for the
correction of stylistic, syntactic and grammatical errors (p. 339).
In the German Bundestag, as was also the practice in the Reichstag during the
German Empire (1871–1918) and the Weimar Republic (1918–1933), the stenographers’
table is placed directly in front of or below the rostrum (Burkhardt, 2003, p. 470). The
Bundestag currently employs thirty stenographers who work in the plenary chamber
in teams of two. One is part of a group of fifteen stenographers and is replaced every
five minutes, while the other, more experienced stenographer is part of a team of seven
and is relieved every thirty minutes. Upon being replaced, the stenographers working
in five-minute rotations go into another room to write up their notes, which they then
check against the notes made by the more experienced stenographer when they leave
the plenary chamber after their thirty-minute shift. This is done to clear up any
unresolved questions as the second stenographer also brings knowledge of the wider
context of the speech due to the longer time spent in the plenary chamber (Burkhardt,
2003, pp. 470, 492; Klein, 1989, p. 981).
The records are then compared to the recordings of the sessions, checked over for
errors, edited and formatted before being passed on to the MPs for revision. The MPs
then have two hours to make any corrections as provided under Rule 117 of the Rules
of Procedure. After the two-hour correction period is over, the records are checked
once more and made available for publication the next day (Olschewski, 2000, p. 337).
The stenographers themselves also have the right to edit the transcripts, although this
is not clearly defined in the Rules of Procedure (Olschewski, 2000, p. 340).
According to Olschewski (2000), the stenographic report need not include a verba-
tim transcription, as a summary of the plenary proceedings could also be considered
sufficient. This is because “Der Stenographische Bericht soll vor allem der sachlichen
Information u¨ber die Beschlu¨sse, Entscheidungen und Entschließungen des Parlaments
sowie u¨ber die von den Fraktionen dafu¨r oder dagegen vorgebrachten Argumente di-
enen” (p. 340). But as no summary could ever be considered fully objective and
acceptable to all parties, the written transcripts must remain as they are (p. 341).
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4.2.1 Written or spoken language?
According to Klein (2014), political speeches “vor allem la¨ngere, haben meist auch
eine schriftliche Fassung, die der O¨ffentlichkeit, insbesondere der Presse verfu¨gbar
gemacht wird” (p. 181).
Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure stipulates that MPs speak freely and not from
a written speech, although the use of notes is allowed. The minutes of the German
Bundestag are a written representation of the spoken discourse that takes place during
the plenary session. After they have been recorded, they may then undergo a process of
editing. This, according to Slembrouck (1992), indicates that the stenographic reports
are therefore written language as proved by the editorial process, which gives them the
hallmarks of written language (e.g. sentences with punctuation marks) (p. 103).
Slembrouck (1992) looks at the representation of spoken speech (anterior discourse)
in text form (representation of discourse), and finds that a true representation is not
possible. Among other things, the representation of discourse fails to take into account
the identities of the speaker and the hearer, their social role relationships, and the
nature and occasion of the activity-type (p. 103).
Slembrouck (1992) examines the Hansard of the British parliament and finds that:
‘spokenness’ is filtered out e.g. stuttering, pauses, etc.; statements are ‘translated’
into formal, standard English e.g. accents are left out, and informal language is made
formal; and ‘explicitness’ and ‘well-formedness’ are added, including the ‘repair’ of
‘obscured messages’ (pp. 104-108).
Heinze (1979) conducts a similar study comparing the written transcripts from the
German Bundestag from 1972–1975 with recordings of the proceedings and finds that
there are considerable differences between the spoken and written versions of the MPs’
speeches. Eighty-six per cent of the utterances in the corpus had been modified in
the process of translating them into written language including a word reduction of
almost ten per cent. Modifications included simplifying complex sentence structures,
removing repetition, pauses and conjunctions at the beginning of the sentence, as well
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as at times adding extra information to provide clarification.
4.2.2 The difference between Lachen and Heiterkeit
Stenographers are not only tasked with recording everything that is said in the
plenary chamber, but also taking note of all non-verbal elements such as applause,
laughter and restlessness. These are all recorded in the parliamentary minutes as they
also serve the purpose of influencing the speech and the speaker, and show public
opinion (Burkhardt, 2004, p. 162). If interjections and non-verbal elements are not
recorded in the plenary minutes, the reaction of the speaker or the intervention of the
Chair will be without context and non-intelligible. Furthermore, these elements add to
the ‘atmosphere’ of the debate (Olschewski, 2000, p. 347). It is moreover important to
certain MPs who otherwise would not have the chance to interact in the debate that
their contributions are recorded in the minutes (Klein, 1989, p. 980).
According to Burkhardt (2003), over their more than 180-year history in German
parliaments, stenographers have developed their own terminology that adequately de-
scribes everything that goes on in parliament including non-verbal elements. Interest-
ingly though, unlike most specialised languages, the language used by stenographers is
also read by the public. This can lead to misunderstanding (pp. 524-525).
An article from the 1911 edition of Stenographische Praxis , a trade journal for
German stenographers (C., 1911), states that, during the Kaiserzeit, a difference was
to be made between ‘Heiterkeit’ as cheerful laughter, perhaps over a joke, and ‘Lachen’
as a means of disagreement in the sense of laughing at (as cited in, Burkhardt, 2003, p.
529). The same can be said for the rules pertaining to the Weimar Republic as shown
in an article from the 1924 edition of Stenographische Praxis (Drews, 1924, as cited in
Burkhardt, 2003, pp. 530-531).
In his study on Lachen and Heiterkeit in the German parliament, Mu¨ller (2011)
corresponded personally with Wolfgang Behm, Head of the stenographic service of the
Bundestag on 27.10.2009 who confirmed these distinctions (footnote 4). Olschewski
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(2000) also confirms this distinction between Lachen and Heiterkeit (p. 348).
4.3 Electoral term specifics
Before any hypotheses can be made about the use of laughter in the German Bun-
destag, the dynamics and special features of each of the four electoral terms will be
briefly described below.
The 16th electoral term saw the creation of the first Merkel cabinet following two
successive red-green cabinets under the leadership of Gerhard Schro¨der. Perhaps the
most distinctive element of the 16th Bundestag was that it was the second time in the
history of the Federal Republic of Germany that a grand coalition was formed. Due
to close election results (with the CDU/CSU and the SPD receiving 35.2% and 34.2%
of the votes respectively), it was not possible to form a small coalition. Traditionally,
grand coalitions are avoided. Indeed,
Dies war ein Novum, wurde doch bislang noch nie eine Bundesregierung
gebildet, die von den Regierungsparteien in dieser Form nicht gewollt war
[...] In der Tat wird eine Große Koalition meist als ein von a¨ußeren Umsta¨nden
erzwungener Ausnahmefall angesehen, der rasch u¨berwunden werden sollte.
(Egle & Zohlnho¨fer, 2010, p. 11)
There are, in general, two hypotheses as to the effects of a grand coalition: blockade
or reform. First, it can be considered that such a government, forced as it were to come
together, will be instable and full of conflict. Due to the comparable sizes of the two
parties that traditionally stand as political rivals, competition can be expected to be
just as fierce within the coalition as without (Egle & Zohlnho¨fer, 2010, pp. 15-21).
The second hypothesis can be best summed up by Chancellor Merkel herself:
Eine große Koalition zweier unterschiedlicher Volksparteien ero¨ffnet die
ganz unerwartete Mo¨glichkeit, zu fragen, was wir gemeinsam besser machen
ko¨nnen – ohne uns dabei dauernd mit Schuldigkeiten aufzuhalten, ohne
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dauernd mit dem Finger auf den anderen zu zeigen und zu fragen, welchen
Missstand der andere – natu¨rlich ganz allein – herbeigefu¨hrt hat. (Merkel,
2005, p. 77; see also Egle & Zohlnho¨fer, 2010, p. 19)
The 17th Bundestag and the second Merkel cabinet saw a return to traditional
coalition ties. Both the CDU/CSU and the SPD lost significant votes, with the latter
being hit the hardest. The three smaller parties all witnessed a rise in votes. The result
was a black-yellow coalition. However, inner and outer tensions led to a breakdown
of what had initially been termed a ‘Wunschkoalition’ and, by the end of the period
the coalition “wirkte [...] nur noch wie eine Krisengemeinschaft aus einer Union, die
sich la¨ngst nach anderen Machtoptionen umsah, und einer FDP, die um das nackte
politische U¨berleben zu ka¨mpfen hatte” (Saalfeld & Zohlnho¨fer, 2015, p. 9).
The 2013 federal elections saw the two parties of the black-yellow coalition develop
in drastically opposite directions. While the CDU/CSU increased its position in com-
parison to the previous election, the FDP fell close to ten percentage points, resulting
in its exclusion from the Bundestag for the first time in its almost seventy-year his-
tory. With only four parties in parliament, a third grand coalition was formed. What
separated the third Merkel cabinet, however, from the first Merkel cabinet was that,
due to the impressive result achieved by the CDU/CSU, which had narrowly missed an
absolute majority, and the SPD’s rather poor performance, the coalition showed the
characteristics of a traditionally small coalition rather than a grand coalition (Korte,
2015, p. 11).
The 19th Bundestag laid claim to several firsts and displayed many unique char-
acteristics. Never in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany had two grand
coalitions been formed successively, nor had it ever taken so long to make a government.
Initially a Jamaica-coalition had been planned, but as no agreement could be reached,
talks returned to a grand coalition, which the SPD had vehemently rejected immedi-
ately following the election. Due to the strenuous nature of the coalition discussions
and the unheard of length of time needed to reach agreement, Decker predicts that
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“Die inzwischen dritte Große Koalition unter Kanzlerin Angela Merkel du¨rfte damit
in noch ho¨herem Maße zu einer ,,Streitkoalition” werden, als es bereits bei der ersten
(2005 bis 2009) und zweiten Großen Koalition (2013 bis 2017) der Fall war” (Decker,
2019, p. 222).
Another peculiarity of the 19th Bundestag is its size. Not since 1953 had more
than five parties been voted into the Bundestag. This changed in 2017 when the FDP
was able to receive enough votes to return to parliament and the AfD made its debut
in the Bundestag. The AfD’s entry into parliament signified the first time since the
1950s that a far-right political party had made it into the Bundestag (Decker, 2019, p.
202). The AfD brought dramatic changes, not just in terms of political ideology, but in
terms of behaviour as well. According to Grabow and Pokorny (2018), the AfD seeks
to insult and attack its political opponents. As such, the AfD “hat den Umgangston
in Parlament und der daru¨ber hinausgehenden O¨ffentlichkeit deutlich vera¨ndert” (p.
12).
The AfD aims to provoke. During their own speeches as well as during those of other
MPs, they attempt to belittle and provoke the other parties. The AfD employs several
methods to draw attention to itself, gain popularity and fight its political opponents.
These, according to Ruhose (2019) can be summed up as polarisation, scandalisation
and emotionalisation (p. 11). Within the Bundestag, the AfD have shaken things
up. No longer focussing on argumentation alone, they have caused the number of
interjections, calls to order and protests to increase dramatically. In fact, the number
of calls to order in the first six months alone of the 19th Bundestag had already
surpassed that of the entire 18th Bundestag (Ruhose, 2019, pp. 24-25).
A quick look at the AfD’s 2016 manifesto makes their strategy very clear:
Je nervo¨ser und je unfairer die Altparteien auf Provokationen reagieren
desto besser. Je mehr sie versuchen, die AfD wegen provokanter Worte
oder Aktionen zu stigmatisieren, desto positiver ist das fu¨r das Profil der
AfD. Niemand gibt der AfD mehr Glaubwu¨rdigkeit als ihre politischen
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Gegner. Deren negative Reaktion muss daher ganz bewusst von der AfD
einkalkuliert werden (AfD, 2016, p. 11, emphasis in original; see also
Ruhose, 2019, p. 11).
The question remains, however, how to deal with this kind of provocation. Openly
confronting the AfD would only draw more attention to the party and its causes,
while avoiding any debate and not addressing any of the issues put forth by the AfD
could be used by the party’s adherents as proof of the oppression and suppression of
freedom of speech by the political elites and the Lu¨genpresse (Ruhose, 2019, p. 21).
Ruhose (2019) proposes fifteen means of dealing with the AfD, which should be used
complementary to one another. These include: remaining calm and not falling for the
AfD’s provocations instead of giving in to hysteria; fighting against the tone the AfD
is trying to set in the Bundestag with their increased use of interjections, interruptions
and provocations; staying different and not allowing the AfD to control the debate; not
adopting the AfD’s communication style; and not taking the AfD’s provocative bait
(pp. 24-33). Below is an illustration of all fifteen methods:
Figure 7: Fifteen strategies for dealing with the AfD
Source: Ruhose, 2019, pp. 24-33.
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Goodwin (2011) also proposes six strategies for dealing with populist extremist par-
ties, although with some caveats: excluding the party, which may have the unintended
effect of reinforcing the outsider status of the party; defusing the importance of the
party’s platform, which could run the risk of leading adherents of the populist extrem-
ist party to feel that their concerns are not being taken seriously; adopting some of
the extremist party’s positions, although this might alienate regular voters and legit-
imise the extremist party’s platform; standing by principles and refusing to back down
or change policies; engaging with the community rather than seeking to win intellec-
tual arguments; and encouraging interaction, e.g. having voters of populist extremist
parties meet with, for example, immigrants in an effort to change their minds (pp.
23-27).
When it comes to dealing with provocation from the AfD in the Bundestag, the
different parties have different methods. They may attempt to ignore the AfD, but
as the largest opposition party currently in the Bundestag that is a difficult task to
achieve. In general all the parties have vowed to make no deals with the AfD, but the
success of this depends on the relative positions of the parties. The CDU/CSU lost a
lot of voters to the AfD (Decker, 2019, p. 214) and has taken a less strict approach to
excluding the AfD, however full cooperation is expected to be impossible in Germany
due to politico-cultural reasons (Decker, 2019, pp. 222-223). The FDP, SPD and Die
Linke parties share some (though to a lesser extent than the CDU/CSU) similarities
with the AfD when it comes to party position and therefore must be careful not to
alienate voters. Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen is most opposed ideologically from the AfD
and therefore does not have to carefully choose its words (Ruhose, 2019, pp. 7-10).
As the AfD writes, “Der Wa¨hleraustausch zwischen AfD und den Gru¨nen ist [...] sehr
gering. Die Gru¨nen sind anders als CDU/CSU, SPD, und Linkspartei keine direkten
Konkurrenten fu¨r die AfD” (AfD, 2016, p. 24). The following section will, among
other things, investigate the strategies employed by the different parties when it comes
to navigating the AfD’s presence in the Bundestag.
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5 Data
The transcripts of 847 plenary sessions of the German Bundestag, spanning four
electoral terms from 18 October 2005 to 27 September 2019, were analysed for oc-
currences of Lachen and Heiterkeit . The transcripts from each plenary session are
available for free on the official website of the German Bundestag. In addition to dif-
ferentiating between the two forms of laughter, the speaking party and the laughing
party as well as the session number were noted. In all, a total of 16,000 instances of
laughter were recorded.
5.1 Hypotheses
Based on the theory outlined above, several hypotheses can be posited about the
use of laughter in the German Bundestag. These are as follows:
1. Laughter can be used to identify party alliances through inclusion (Heiterkeit)
and exclusion (Lachen). Parties are likely to use Lachen when the opposition is
speaking and Heiterkeit for their own party members or political allies. Further-
more, laughing together should indicate party alliances;
2. Lachen is used as a means of attack and criticism, while Heiterkeit indicates
general amusement. Therefore, the more Lachen there is in any given period, the
more tumultuous the overall inter-party dynamics. Conversely, more Heiterkeit
should indicate more unity;
3. As the length of time it takes to form a government can be used as an indication
of how difficult the coalition negotiations were, it is expected that the longer it
takes to form a coalition, the more Lachen there will be between the parties in
the coalition. The opposite is expected to hold true for Heiterkeit;
4. Speaking time is allocated based on the size of the party in the Bundestag. As
laughter, and above all Lachen, can be used to participate in the debate, the
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more marginalised parties are likely to use Lachen more often as a means to
compensate for the difference in speaking time;
5. In line with Sebaldt’s findings that exclusionary tactics used against the PDS, a
new party in the Bundestag considered somewhat extreme, declined as the other
parties grew accustomed to its presence, Lachen at the AfD is expected to wane
over time as Heiterkeit increases;
6. There are many theories about how to interact with populist extremist parties
in politics. Based on the literature, the other parties are expected to use Lachen
more to compensate for the AfD’s extreme use of laughter, or use Lachen less as
a means of ignoring the AfD’s provocation.
5.2 Description of the analysis
The data was manually entered into Excel for each period. The four periods con-
sisting of 847 sessions were then collated together into a database using the statistical
software Stata. The software was chosen to facilitate the process of working with 16,000
observations. Stata was then used to obtain summary statistics, which were then fed
back into excel to create the tables and graphs below.
6 Results
Table 2 below shows the number of observations over each period. It is important to
keep in mind that data for period 19 only covers half the period as the 19th Bundestag
is currently still underway. It is therefore only to be expected that it will have fewer
observations than the other periods. What is interesting, however, is that despite its
incompleteness, it already has close to as many observations as period 16. Assuming
the trend continues, it can be inferred that period 19, together with period 17, will
show the greatest amounts of laughter, while period 16 shows the least. Period 18 is
also comparatively calm.
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Table 2: Number of observations per period
It is, however, necessary to further break down the observations into Lachen and
Heiterkeit in order to see the dynamics that are at play. Figure 8 shows the ratio of
Lachen to Heiterkeit over all four periods. Here it can be seen that, in addition to
having the most overall observations, period 17 also has the highest amount of Lachen
and an almost even ratio of Heiterkeit to Lachen, with Heiterkeit marginally exceeding
Lachen. Period 19 is the only period in which Lachen outweighs Heiterkeit. In contrast,
period 18 has both the greatest amount of Heiterkeit and the lowest amount of Lachen
of all the periods.
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Figure 8: Amount of Lachen and Heiterkeit by period
Figure 9 shows the distribution of Lachen and Heiterkeit as a percentage of total
laughter over the four periods. It is interesting to note the seesaw effect that is at play
here.
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Figure 9: Lachen and Heiterkeit as a percentage of total laughter by period
Figure 10 shows the distribution of Lachen and Heiterkeit spread over all ses-
sions. Notably, while Heiterkeit remains somewhat constant throughout, the amount
of Lachen rises and falls with the different periods.
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Figure 10: Lachen and Heiterkeit across all sessions 2005–2019
Note: The data has been smoothened using moving averages (over 20 sessions) for better visuals.
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Table 3 shows which parties are laughed at the most (both Lachen and Heiterkeit)
spread over the four periods. It is interesting to note that the CDU/CSU receives more
than one-third of its total instances of Heiterkeit in the 18th period alone and over half
of its total Lachen in the 17th period. The only time the FDP receives more laughter
than Heiterkeit is also in the 17th period, while the SPD receives more Heiterkeit than
Lachen over all four periods. The same can be said for B90/Die Gru¨nen. Both Die
Linke and the FDP receive overall more Lachen than Heiterkeit, but the true outlier
is the AfD, which receives more than three times the amount of Lachen compared to
Heiterkeit.Table 3 In numbers 
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Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	
16	 17	 18	 19	
By	CDU/CSU	
Lachen	 268	 482	 341	 209	 1300	
Heiterkeit	 1005	 861	 1200	 555	 3621	
	FDP	
Lachen	 258	 470	 		 186	 914	
Heiterkeit	 504	 755	 		 412	 1671	
	SPD		
Lachen	 312	 1286	 193	 358	 2149	
Heiterkeit	 976	 924	 1252	 522	 3674	
DIELINKE	
Lachen	 328	 418	 275	 252	 1273	
Heiterkeit	 209	 382	 375	 233	 1199	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
Lachen	 219	 781	 409	 348	 1757	
Heiterkeit	 308	 556	 556	 361	 1781	
AfD	
Lachen	 		 		 		 702	 702	
Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 205	 205	
 
 
Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	16	 17	 18	 19	
At	CDU/CSU	 Lachen	 367	 1052	 485	 403	 2307	Heiterkeit	 740	 677	 1046	 417	 2880	
At	FDP	 Lachen	 226	 665	 		 116	 1007	Heiterkeit	 290	 389	 		 189	 868	
	At	SPD		 Lachen	 231	 396	 178	 257	 1062	Heiterkeit	 737	 616	 787	 275	 2415	
At	DIELINKE	 Lachen	 200	 227	 234	 138	 799	Heiterkeit	 153	 240	 272	 120	 785	
At	B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Lachen	 100	 150	 150	 115	 515	Heiterkeit	 249	 325	 370	 129	 1073	
At	AfD	 Lachen	 		 		 		 512	 512	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 165	 165	
Table 3: Lachen and Heiterkeit at the different parties in numbers
Table 4 shows the distribution of Lachen and Heiterkeit by party across all four
periods. It is interesting to see that the SPD uses Lachen more than Heiterkeit only in
the 18th period, while the exact opposite is true for Die Linke, which uses Heiterkeit
more than Lachen only in the 18th period.
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Table 4: Lachen and Heiterkeit by the different parties in numbers
Table 5 shows Heiterkeit and Lachen as a percentage of total laughter received by
the different parties. Interestingly, in the 17th period both the CDU/CSU and the
FDP receive considerably more Lachen than Heiterkeit than in any other period.
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Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	
16	 17	 18	 19	
By	CDU/CSU	
Lachen	 21	 36	 22	 27	 26	
Heiterkeit	 79	 64	 78	 73	 74	
By	FDP	
Lachen	 34	 38	 		 31	 35	
Heiterkeit	 66	 62	 		 69	 65	
By	SPD		
Lachen	 24	 58	 13	 41	 37	
Heiterkeit	 76	 42	 87	 59	 63	
By	DIELINKE	
Lachen	 61	 52	 42	 52	 51	
Heiterkeit	 39	 48	 58	 48	 49	
By	B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
Lachen	 42	 58	 42	 49	 50	
Heiterkeit	 58	 42	 58	 51	 50	
By	AfD	
Lachen	 		 		 		 77	 77	
Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 23	 23	
 
 
 
 
Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	16	 17	 18	 19	
At	CDU/CSU	 Lachen	 33	 61	 32	 49	 44	Heiterkeit	 67	 39	 68	 51	 56	
At	FDP	 Lachen	 44	 63	 		 38	 54	Heiterkeit	 56	 37	 		 62	 46	
	At	SPD		 Lachen	 24	 39	 18	 48	 31	Heiterkeit	 76	 61	 82	 52	 69	
At	DIELINKE	 Lachen	 57	 49	 46	 53	 50	Heiterkeit	 43	 51	 54	 47	 50	
At	B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Lachen	 29	 32	 29	 47	 32	Heiterkeit	 71	 68	 71	 53	 68	
At	AfD	 Lachen	 		 		 		 76	 76	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 24	 24	
Table 5: Lachen and Heiterkeit at the different parties as a percentage of total laughter
Table 6 shows the amount of Heiterkeit and Lachen by party as a percentage of
total laughter. Notably, the SPD laughs considerably more in the 17th period. There
also seems to be a correlation between the ratio of Lachen to Heiterkeit and the size of
the party. The smaller the party, the more likely it is to use Lachen. Here the results
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range from the CDU/CSU (26% Lachen – 74% Heiterkeit) to Die Linke (51% Lachen
– 49% Heiterkeit). The AfD is, as always, the outlier and the exception to the rule. As
the third largest party in its period, it is three times more likely to use Lachen than
Heiterkeit.
Table 5 In percentage 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 In percentage 
 
Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	
16	 17	 18	 19	
By	CDU/CSU	
Lachen	 21	 36	 22	 27	 26	
Heiterkeit	 79	 64	 78	 73	 74	
By	FDP	
Lachen	 34	 38	 		 31	 35	
Heiterkeit	 66	 62	 		 69	 65	
By	SPD		
Lachen	 24	 58	 13	 41	 37	
Heiterkeit	 76	 42	 87	 59	 63	
By	DIELINKE	
Lachen	 61	 52	 42	 52	 51	
Heiterkeit	 39	 48	 58	 48	 49	
By	B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
Lachen	 42	 58	 42	 49	 50	
Heiterkeit	 58	 42	 58	 51	 50	
By	AfD	
Lachen	 		 		 		 77	 77	
Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 23	 23	
 
 
 
 
Party	 Type	of	interjection	
Period	 Total	16	 17	 18	 19	
At	CDU/CSU	 Lachen	 33	 61	 32	 49	 44	Heiterkeit	 67	 39	 68	 51	 56	
At	FDP	 Lachen	 44	 63	 		 38	 54	Heiterkeit	 56	 37	 		 62	 46	
	At	SPD		 Lachen	 24	 39	 18	 48	 31	Heiterkeit	 76	 61	 82	 52	 69	
At	DIELINKE	 Lachen	 57	 49	 46	 53	 50	Heiterkeit	 43	 51	 54	 47	 50	
At	B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Lachen	 29	 32	 29	 47	 32	Heiterkeit	 71	 68	 71	 53	 68	
At	AfD	 Lachen	 		 		 		 76	 76	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		 24	 24	
Table 6: Lachen and Heiterkeit by the different parties as a percentage of total laughter
The following figures show the distribution of Lachen and Heiterkeit either by or at
the individual parties as a percentage of the total. The use of Heiterkeit is expected to
somewhat correspond with party size and, therefore, speaking time, while Lachen can
show which parties are particularly disruptive or particularly contested in any given
period.
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Figure 11 shows that Heiterkeit at and Heiterkeit by in period 16 almost perfectly
correspond with one another, hinting towards parties using Heiterkeit for their own
members. In terms of Lachen, although the parties use it in almost equal measure, the
CDU/CSU receives the clear majority, accounting for 33% of all Lachen.
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Figure 11: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party as a percentage of the total, period 16
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Figure 12 shows the distribution of Lachen and Heiterkeit in period 17. Again
Heiterkeit at and Heiterkeit by are rather uniformly distributed and representative of
the parties’ relative sizes. The story, however, becomes more interesting when looking
at Lachen. Here, the SPD accounts for the clear majority of Lachen, with B90/Die
Gru¨nen not far behind. When it comes to receiving Lachen, the inverse appears, with
the CDU/CSU followed by the FDP receiving the most Lachen. This hints at a strong
division between government and opposition.
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Figure 12: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party as a percentage of the total, period 17
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Figure 13 shows the use and reception of Lachen and Heiterkeit in the 18th period.
Again, the use of Heiterkeit is quite predictable, while Lachen paints a more interesting
picture. Here B90/Die Gru¨nen and the CDU/CSU use Lachen the most, while the
CDU/CSU alone receives close to half of all Lachen. The other parties are somewhat
evenly divided when it comes to receiving Lachen. This again points to party roles and
alliances as the CDU/CSU was the strongest party in the grand coalition by far and
the farthest from the opposition on the political spectrum.
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Figure 13: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party as a percentage of the total, period 18
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The dynamics of period 19 are illustrated in Figure 14. Heiterkeit again is some-
what predictable and in line with party size, although the CDU/CSU does receive
proportionally more Heiterkeit than it gives. Once more, the noteworthy results lie in
the use of Lachen. Here the AfD has the overwhelming monopoly on Lachen, both
giving and receiving. The CDU/CSU and the SPD, the two parties in power receive
the second highest amounts of Lachen.
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Figure 14: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party as a percentage of the total, period 19
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This study so far has looked at which parties laugh the most and which parties
receive the most laughter across all the periods, but the actual dynamics between
the parties remain speculative at best. Table 7 shows the distribution of laughter
per party for period 16 as a percentage. The coloured squares act as a visual aid,
becoming darker as the laughter intensifies. Panels (a) and (b) show the rate at which
the different parties laugh (Lachen and Heiterkeit) at the other individual parties, while
(c) and (d) show the distribution of the reception of laughter (Lachen and Heiterkeit).
Here it can be seen, for instance, that the parties very rarely use Lachen for their own
members, while they are more likely to use Heiterkeit within their own party.
Therefore, excluding the parties’ interactions with their own members, several ob-
servations can be made. First, in period 16, the CDU/CSU uses Lachen the least
towards the SPD and the most towards Die Linke. The SPD, on the other hand, uses
Lachen the most towards the FDP and the least towards B90/Die Gru¨nen, followed
by the CDU/CSU. The three opposition parties direct the majority of their Lachen at
the parties of the grand coalition, though the FDP tends to focus its attention more
towards the SPD than the CDU/CSU, with which it traditionally forms a coalition,
and B90/Die Gru¨nen laughs less at the SPD, again a traditional coalition partner. The
SPD laughs most at the FDP with the latter receiving 50% of its total Lachen from
the former.
When it comes to Heiterkeit, the greatest numbers are consistently reserved for
own party members. Excluding these results, the following observations can be made.
Between the two parties of the grand coalition, Heiterkeit is used in a virtually text-
book nature with both the CDU/CSU and the SPD almost ignoring the parties of
the opposition. Among the parties of the opposition, Heiterkeit that is not directed
towards their own party is quite evenly distributed. The only exception is the FDP,
which continues to show a certain alliance with the CDU/CSU. Interestingly, B90/Die
Gru¨nen receives very little laughter of either kind from any of the other parties.
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	 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 2	 11	 20	 48	 18	 100	
SPD	 13	 2	 48	 31	 6	 100	
FDP	 29	 44	 1	 15	 11	 100	
DIELINKE	 54	 26	 14	 1	 5	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 51	 13	 21	 12	 3	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 56	 29	 7	 2	 6	 100	
SPD	 30	 55	 4	 1	 9	 100	
FDP	 29	 18	 39	 4	 10	 100	
DIELINKE	 9	 13	 14	 53	 12	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 16	 22	 9	 2	 50	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 c.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 1	 10	 18	 43	 27	 100	
SPD	 11	 2	 44	 32	 11	 100	
FDP	 18	 50	 1	 15	 15	 100	
DIELINKE	 43	 33	 13	 1	 9	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 42	 16	 24	 13	 5	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 d.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 53	 28	 13	 2	 5	 100	
SPD	 28	 53	 9	 3	 7	 100	
FDP	 19	 12	 53	 8	 8	 100	
DIELINKE	 10	 8	 12	 65	 4	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 16	 22	 13	 7	 41	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
 
Table 7: Party dynamics in %, period 16
Table 8 shows the use of laughter in period 17. Here, the dynamics are very different,
above all between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Furthermore, in this period, the two
coalition parties barely laugh at each other. The CDU/CSU uses Lachen towards
the FDP as much as it does towards its own party (2%), while the FDP gives the
CDU/CSU 3% of its total Lachen, compared to 2% directed at its own party members.
For the coalition parties, the SPD is the clear enemy, receiving exactly half of both the
CDU/CSU’s and the FDP’s Lachen (panel a). The parties in opposition are also very
clear in their distribution of Lachen, with the overwhelming majority aimed towards
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the government. Both the CDU/CSU and the FDP receive over half their Lachen
from the SPD, while the parties of the opposition each receive almost equal amounts
of Lachen from the CDU/CSU and the FDP with each party accounting for close to
50% of their total instances of Lachen (panel c).
The CDU/CSU and the FDP use Heiterkeit with each other in almost equal measure
as they do with their own parties. In fact, the FDP actually directs more Heiterkeit
towards the CDU/CSU (46%) than it does its own party (44%), the only time this is
observed in the whole study (panel b). The parties of the opposition tend to keep their
Heiterkeit to themselves, although B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die Linke do give 35% and
27% of their Heiterkeit to the SPD respectively. In return, B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die
Linke receive 33% and 29% of their total Heiterkeit from the SPD (panel d).
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		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 2	 50	 2	 28	 17	 100	
SPD	 57	 3	 37	 2	 1	 100	
FDP	 3	 50	 2	 28	 18	 100	
DIELINKE	 62	 4	 32	 1	 1	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 56	 2	 36	 3	 2	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 59	 5	 30	 2	 4	 100	
SPD	 8	 57	 3	 12	 20	 100	
FDP	 46	 4	 44	 2	 4	 100	
DIELINKE	 5	 27	 1	 50	 16	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 8	 35	 5	 9	 43	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 c.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 1	 51	 1	 18	 30	 100	
SPD	 44	 7	 43	 3	 3	 100	
FDP	 1	 52	 1	 15	 31	 100	
DIELINKE	 42	 8	 40	 1	 8	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 42	 7	 41	 2	 8	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 d.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 51	 8	 35	 2	 5	 100	
SPD	 5	 59	 3	 12	 22	 100	
FDP	 39	 5	 51	 1	 4	 100	
DIELINKE	 4	 29	 4	 50	 13	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 6	 33	 6	 11	 43	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
 
Table 8: Party dynamics in %, period 17
Table 9 shows the distribution of laughter per party for period 18 as a percentage.
Here, very clear party lines are again drawn between the ruling coalition (the CDU/CSU
and the SPD) and the opposition (B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die Linke). Although the
CDU/CSU uses Lachen considerably less towards the SPD than the SPD does towards
the CDU/CSU (12% compared to 27%) both parties receive substantially more Lachen
from the opposition (panel a). However, the CDU/CSU appears to be more in the cross
hairs of the opposition, receiving 74% and 71% of Die Linke’s and B90/Die Gru¨nen’s
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total Lachen respectively, whereas the SPD only receives 21% of their Lachen. The
SPD retains some alliance with B90/Die Gru¨nen, laughing slightly less at its traditional
coalition partner than its current one (25% compared to 27%) (panel a).
Heiterkeit again seems to be distributed quite clearly according to alliances with
the members of the grand coalition sharing Heiterkeit with each other, but rarely with
the members of the opposition (panels b and d). When it comes to the opposition,
their use of Heiterkeit is quite evenly spread over the other parties with their own party
receiving the lion’s share of their respective Heiterkeit.
		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 3	 12	 54	 31	 100	
SPD	 27	 3	 45	 25	 100	
DIELINKE	 74	 21	 1	 4	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 71	 21	 5	 2	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 67	 24	 3	 6	 100	
SPD	 35	 50	 5	 9	 100	
DIELINKE	 12	 16	 48	 23	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 21	 23	 14	 42	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 c.	Lachen	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 2	 9	 37	 52	 100	
SPD	 21	 3	 30	 46	 100	
DIELINKE	 62	 29	 1	 7	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 61	 28	 6	 6	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 d.	Heiterkeit	 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 57	 31	 3	 8	 100	
SPD	 26	 57	 6	 12	 100	
DIELINKE	 10	 18	 51	 21	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 13	 23	 18	 46	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		
 
 
Table 9: Party dynamics in %, period 18
Table 10 shows the distribution of laughter for period 19. As was expected, a very
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different picture emerges from this table, with almost all the colour concentrated in
the AfD’s column. While the other tables showed certain consistencies, period 19 looks
completely different. It is first of all strikingly clear that the AfD receives the most
Lachen from all the other parties (panel a) and all the other parties receive most of
their Lachen from the AfD (panel c). Of notice, however, is that the FDP uses Lachen
considerably less towards the AfD than any of the other parties, reserving only slightly
less for the CDU/CSU and the SPD (panel a). The FDP also receives the smallest
percentage (8%) of the AfD’s total Lachen. Both Die Linke and B90/Die Gru¨nen use a
significant amount of Lachen towards the CDU/CSU (23% and 22% respectively), but
only a negligible amount towards the SPD (both 4%). The AfD uses Lachen mostly
for the CDU/CSU, followed by the SPD. The AfD receives most of its Lachen from
the SPD (32%), although it is rather evenly distributed among the parties, with the
FDP constituting the only exception (representing only 7% of the AfD’s total received
Lachen) (panel c).
In terms of Heiterkeit, there seems to be a somewhat even distribution among the
parties that are not the AfD. The AfD receives close to no Heiterkeit from the other
parties and an impressive 0% of B90/Die Gru¨nen’s total Heiterkeit. In terms of the
other parties, certain alliances can be observed with the CDU/CSU using Heiterkeit
the most for the SPD and vice versa, and the FDP aligning itself with the CDU/CSU.
However, due to the presence of the AfD, no stark party alliances can be discerned.
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		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	 Total	
CDUCSU	 0	 7	 7	 11	 4	 70	 100	
SPD	 7	 1	 10	 2	 2	 79	 100	
FDP	 27	 20	 0	 13	 5	 36	 100	
DIELINKE	 23	 4	 5	 1	 1	 66	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 22	 4	 7	 1	 1	 65	 100	
AfD	 35	 29	 8	 14	 13	 1	 100	
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	By																					At	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 61	 18	 10	 4	 6	 1	 100	
SPD	 30	 41	 11	 9	 8	 1	 100	
FDP	 31	 13	 43	 6	 8	 1	 100	
DIELINKE	 15	 24	 12	 36	 12	 0	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 28	 21	 11	 12	 26	 1	 100	
AFD	 11	 4	 8	 1	 1	 77	 100	
		 		 		 c.	Lachen	 		 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 0	 6	 11	 13	 17	 54	 100	
SPD	 5	 2	 13	 4	 5	 71	 100	
FDP	 11	 24	 0	 9	 17	 39	 100	
DIELINKE	 15	 4	 15	 1	 2	 63	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 7	 5	 8	 2	 2	 75	 100	
AFD	 16	 32	 7	 19	 25	 1	 100	
		 		 		 d.	Heiterkeit	 		 		 		
	At																					By	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	 Total	
CDU/CSU	 42	 20	 16	 5	 14	 3	 100	
SPD	 19	 42	 10	 12	 15	 2	 100	
FDP	 15	 15	 46	 8	 11	 5	 100	
DIELINKE	 10	 21	 10	 39	 20	 0	 100	
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 13	 18	 13	 13	 42	 1	 100	
AFD	 3	 2	 1	 1	 2	 92	 100	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
 
 Table 10: Party dynamics in %, period 19
Table 11 is a correlation matrix of (a) Lachen and (b) Heiterkeit between the dif-
ferent parties. It shows which parties are most likely to laugh at the same time. In
a correlation matrix, the coefficients range from +1.00 (a perfect positive relation-
ship) to -1.00 (a perfect negative relationship). For period 16, it can be seen that the
CDU/CSU and the SPD are most likely to use both Lachen and Heiterkeit together,
while for Lachen all other correlations are negative. Die Linke has the highest negative
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correlations with all the parties when it comes to Lachen. In terms of Heiterkeit, the
CDU/CSU is somewhat likely to laugh together with the FDP and the correlation
between the SPD and B90/Die Gru¨nen is also positive. Interestingly, in terms of Heit-
erkeit, the correlation between the three opposition parties is also positive, although
only marginally so.
 
		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
		 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.10	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 -0.06	 -0.25	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.34	 -0.34	 -0.28	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.15	 -0.05	 -0.16	 -0.22	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		
		 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.27	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 0.13	 -0.07	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.17	 -0.11	 0.03	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.02	 0.10	 0.11	 0.08	 1.00	
 
 
Figure 16 Period 17 
 
		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
		
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 -0.47	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 0.43	 -0.47	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.21	 -0.03	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.29	 0.08	 -0.30	 -0.01	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		
	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 -0.36	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 0.66	 -0.35	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.23	 0.24	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.20	 0.44	 -0.20	 0.21	 1.00	
 
Figure 17 Period 18 
 
		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
	
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		
SPD	 0.04	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.40	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
Table 11: Correlation matrix, period 16
Table 12 shows that in period 17 the likelihood of the CDU/CSU and the SPD
using either Lachen or Heiterkeit together is significantly negative. The same is true
for the SPD and the FDP. For both types of laughter, both the CDU/CSU and the
FDP only have positive correlations with each other Among the parties in opposition,
there are no notable positive correlations when it comes to Lachen, but they are all
more likely to use Heiterkeit together, above all the SPD and B90/Die Gru¨nen.
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		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
		
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 -0.47	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 0.43	 -0.47	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.21	 -0.03	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.29	 0.08	 -0.30	 -0.01	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		
	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
SPD	 -0.36	 1.00	 		 		 		
FDP	 0.66	 -0.35	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.23	 0.24	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.20	 0.44	 -0.20	 0.21	 1.00	
 
Figure 17 Period 18 
 
Table 12: Correlation matrix, period 17
In period 18, it appears the parties tend to use Lachen alone. Table 13 shows that
in regards to Lachen there are almost no positive correlations between the parties, with
the CDU/CSU and the SPD posing the only, albeit weak, exception. When it comes to
Heiterkeit, the party lines are pretty clear with the CDU/CSU and the SPD laughing
together and B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die Linke laughing together.
 
		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
	
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		
SPD	 0.04	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.40	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.49	 -0.24	 -0.20	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		
		 		 a.	Heiterkeit	 		
	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		
SPD	 0.21	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.18	 -0.03	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.10	 0.08	 0.26	 1.00	
 
 
Figure 18 Period 19 
 
		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		
		
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.21	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
FDP	 0.15	 0.02	 1.00	 		 		 		
DIELINKE	 0.03	 0.23	 0.01	 1.00	 		 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 0.08	 0.26	 0.00	 0.21	 1.00	 		
AFD	 -0.35	 -0.49	 -0.26	 -0.38	 -0.48	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		
		 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	 AFD	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.20	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
FDP	 0.20	 0.05	 1.00	 		 		 		
DIELINKE	 0.04	 0.27	 0.09	 1.00	 		 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 0.15	 0.32	 0.15	 0.35	 1.00	 		
AFD	 -0.19	 -0.24	 -0.09	 -0.15	 -0.18	 1.00	
 
 
Table 13: Correlation matrix, period 18
Period 19 paints a very different picture as can be seen in Table 14. Here, there
is, to a varying degree, a positive correlation between all parties except the AfD when
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it comes to both Lachen and Heiterkeit. The AfD has negative correlations with all
parties, whereby the SPD is most negatively correlated over both types of laughter.
 
		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		
	
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		
SPD	 0.04	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.40	 -0.21	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.49	 -0.24	 -0.20	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		
		 		 a.	Heiterkeit	 		
	 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		
SPD	 0.21	 1.00	 		 		
DIELINKE	 -0.18	 -0.03	 1.00	 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 -0.10	 0.08	 0.26	 1.00	
 
 
Figure 18 Period 19 
 
		 		 		 a.	Lachen	 		 		 		
		
CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	 B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 AFD	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.21	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
FDP	 0.15	 0.02	 1.00	 		 		 		
DIELINKE	 0.03	 0.23	 0.01	 1.00	 		 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 0.08	 0.26	 0.00	 0.21	 1.00	 		
AFD	 -0.35	 -0.49	 -0.26	 -0.38	 -0.48	 1.00	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 		 b.	Heiterkeit	 		 		
		 CDU/CSU	 SPD	 FDP	 DIELINKE	
B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN	 AFD	
CDU/CSU	 1.00	 		 		 		 		 		
SPD	 0.20	 1.00	 		 		 		 		
FDP	 0.20	 0.05	 1.00	 		 		 		
DIELINKE	 0.04	 0.27	 0.09	 1.00	 		 		
B90/DIE	GRÜNEN	 0.15	 0.32	 0.15	 0.35	 1.00	 		
AFD	 -0.19	 -0.24	 -0.09	 -0.15	 -0.18	 1.00	
 
 Table 14: Correlation matrix, period 19
Figure 15 below shows the amount of Lachen between the parties of the ruling
coalition for each period in relation to the length of time required to form a coalition.
Here there is a clear linear relationship between the amount of Lachen inside the
coalition and the length of time it takes to build a coalition. Period 19 is the exception.
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Figure 15: Lachen between coalition parties as a function of time needed to form a coalition
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Figure 16 below shows the amount of Heiterkeit between the parties of the ruling
coalition for each period in relation to the length of time they needed to form a coalition.
Here, the linear relationship is less clear and period 18 is the exception.
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Figure 16: Heiterkeit between coalition parties as a function of time needed to form a coalition
Figure 17 shows the use of Lachen and Heiterkeit by party compared to the amount
of speaking time allocated to each party in the 16th Bundestag. A general tendency
can be observed that Lachen increases as speaking time decreases, although B90/Die
Gru¨nen uses slightly less Lachen than Die Linke.
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Figure 17: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party in relation to speaking time allocated, period 16
Figure 18 shows Lachen and Heiterkeit compared to speaking time for period 17.
Again, the same tendency can be observed, with the SPD providing the only exception.
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
CDU/CSU SPD FDP DIE	LINKE B90/DIE	
GRÜNEN
Sh
ar
e	
of
	s
pe
ak
in
g	
tim
e
Sh
ar
e	
of
	L
ac
he
n	
an
d	
He
ite
rk
ei
t
Heiterkeit
Lachen
Time
Figure 18: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party in relation to speaking time allocated, period 17
Figure 19 shows the relationship between speaking time and Lachen in period 18.
As in period 17, the only exception is the SPD, which this time uses less Lachen than
the CDU/CSU despite receiving less speaking time.
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Figure 19: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party in relation to speaking time allocated, period 18
Figure 20 again shows a loose correlation between Lachen and speaking time, but
as always the AfD stands in the way of any predicted behaviour.
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Figure 20: Lachen and Heiterkeit by party in relation to speaking time allocated, period 19
Figure 21 shows the frequency of interjections at the AfD over the 116 sessions of
the 19th Bundestag that are comprised in this study. The AfD has been removed from
the sample so as not to skew the results. What remains are the reactions of the other
five parties. The graph shows a consistent preference for Lachen over Heiterkeit when
dealing with the AfD.
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Figure 21: Frequency of interjections at the AfD
Note: 5 session moving average for interjection frequencies was applied to smoothen the line for
better presentation
7 Discussion
The present study put forward six hypotheses based on the literature presented
in the first four chapters. The current chapter will evaluate these hypotheses and
determine, based on the descriptive analysis in Chapter 6, whether or not they could
be confirmed.
Hypothesis one posited that, based on the theory of laughter as a means of ex-
clusion and inclusion as well as the several sources that attest to the differentiation
stenographers make between Lachen and Heiterkeit in the minutes of the plenary pro-
ceedings of the German Bundestag, laughter can be used to identify party alliances
through inclusion (Heiterkeit) and exclusion (Lachen). This means that it can be ex-
pected that the parties forming the government should use Heiterkeit when interacting
with one another and Lachen when reacting to speeches made by the opposition. The
inverse should be true for the opposition. Furthermore, as Hoinle (2001) finds, not only
62
are members of the same party or coalition expected to laugh together, but former,
potential or current coalition partners as well.
Tables 7-10 show the relationships between the parties. This hypothesis certainly
holds true for period 17, which shows very little Lachen and high amounts of Heit-
erkeit between the CDU/CSU and the FDP, the two parties of the ruling coalition.
This result stands somewhat in contrast with the other periods, which were all led
by a grand coalition made up of the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Here, although there
are still clear tendencies towards using Heiterkeit for each other and Lachen for the
parties in opposition, the extent is not as discernible as it is in the 17th period. This
could be due to traditional alliances in which the CDU/CSU and the FDP often form
a coalition together, while the SPD is traditionally in opposition. Indeed, regardless of
which parties are in government and which parties are in opposition, these traditional
ties can still be observed in the way that Lachen and Heiterkeit are used. For in-
stance, during a grand coalition, the SPD will receive more of the FDP’s Lachen while
the CDU/CSU will be the recipient of the majority of B90/Die Gru¨nen’s (the SPD’s
traditional coalition partner) Lachen. In terms of Heiterkeit, the opposite is true.
However, based on the overwhelming amount of Lachen between the CDU/CSU
and the SPD during the 17th period, the only period in this study in which they are
not in a coalition, it can be inferred that although as coalition partners they do use
Lachen with one another more than the traditional black-yellow coalition, they do
make a considerable effort when they are in government together.
In order to examine this hypothesis in even more depth, a correlation matrix was
created to discover the likelihood that the parties will use Lachen/Heiterkeit together
(Tables 11-14). Here the hypothesis extends to include laughing together, and above
all using Heiterkeit together, as a sign of party alliance. In period 16, the party lines
are very clear with the members of the grand coalition receiving positive correlations
for both Lachen and Heiterkeit, while the members of the opposition are likely to use
Heiterkeit together. The only exceptions are the relationships between the CDU/CSU
and the FDP, and between the SPD and B90/Die Gru¨nen, which also show positive
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correlations when it comes to Heiterkeit. Die Linke demonstrates the lowest likelihood
of laughing with the other parties. In period 17, the tensions between the CDU/CSU
and the SPD described above become even more apparent with a highly negative
correlation between the two parties for both forms of laughter. In terms of Heiterkeit,
the correlation is only positive between the coalition parties and between the opposition
parties, showing clear party lines.
Period 18 again shows a clear distinction between government and opposition, with
the SPD’s slight positive correlation with B90/Die Gru¨nen for Heiterkeit the only
exception.
Period 19 presents a completely different picture from the previous periods. Inter-
estingly, here, it is difficult to discern which parties are in government and which in
opposition, in particular with regard to the SPD and the FDP. The former also shows
higher positive correlations with B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die Linke, while the latter shows
higher positive correlations with the CDU/CSU, hinting more towards traditional ties.
However, for the first time, all parties show positive correlations across both types of
laughter – with one exception. The AfD negatively correlates with all parties and to a
significant extent.
Hypothesis two is that Lachen can be used as a barometer to gauge the level of
unrest in any given period. As Lachen can be considered negative and exclusionary,
while Heiterkeit is positive and inclusionary, more Lachen should attest to less collabo-
ration between the parties. From Figures 8, 9 and 10 it can be inferred that periods 17
and 19 are the most tumultuous whereas period 18 is the most harmonious. Although
it was stated that the ‘Wunschkoalition’ formed in period 17 between the CDU/CSU
and the FDP was wrought with conflict, the level of Lachen between these two parties
is almost non-existent and the level of Heiterkeit indicating in-group inclusion is very
high (Table 8). The high level of overall Lachen in the period in comparison to the level
of Heiterkeit could therefore be due to the fact that the parties had returned to their
usual places and the enemy lines had been clearly drawn in the sand. Indeed, Figure 12
shows that the two ruling parties receive considerably more laughter than the parties
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in opposition and the SPD, a newly returned member of the opposition uses Lachen
substantially more than any other party (37%), followed by B90/Die Gru¨nen (23%).
The CDU/CSU (42%) and the FDP (27%) receive the most amount of Lachen overall.
Another reason, however, could also lie in external factors and the rocky nature of
the period, which included among others, the aftermath of the global financial crisis,
the Eurozone crisis and revolutions and civil wars in the Middle East as well as rising
right-wing extremism within Germany (Saalfeld & Zohlnho¨fer, 2015, 18-22). Heiterkeit
seems to correspond with the allocation of speaking time with the CDU/CSU receiving
the most Heiterkeit and Die Linke the least.
The reason for the increased amount of Lachen in period 19 is quite clear, both from
the literature and the results of the analysis. Since the AfD’s entry into the Bundestag,
the traditional rules of the game have been turned on their head. The amount of Lachen
in the 19th period, which has as yet only half run its course, has already surpassed
the values of both the 16th and 18th periods. Heiterkeit, on the other hand, appears
to be at normal and expected levels (Figure 8). Figure 14 reveals the source of the
increase in laughter with the AfD laughing 2-3 times more than any other party in
the Bundestag and accounting for 34% of all instances of Lachen. Indeed, the AfD
calls for this kind of behaviour in their own manifesto, stating that provocation is the
best means of achieving credibility. Laughter and upheaval are some of the tools they
have in their belt towards achieving political victory. However, the other parties are
clearly allowing themselves to be provoked, as the AfD also receives the most Lachen,
obtaining one-third of all instances. This is followed by the two parties in government,
the CDU/CSU (26%) and the SPD (17%). Heiterkeit again appears to be more or less
evenly distributed according to the allocation of speaking time (Figure 14).
Period 18 has more Heiterkeit than any other period in this study as well as the
highest ratio of Heiterkeit (74%) to Lachen (26%) (Figure 9). Interestingly, Figure 13
shows that the CDU/CSU receives close to half of all instances of Lachen, followed
by Die Linke, while B90/Die Gru¨nen uses Lachen more than any other party (34%).
Surprisingly, although Die Linke’ s use of Lachen exceeds its use of Heiterkeit in all
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other periods, the 18th Bundestag is an exception with Lachen making up only 42%
of Die Linke’ s instances of laughter (Table 6). When it comes to Heiterkeit, both
the CDU/CSU and the SPD are rather evenly footed, as are B90/Die Gru¨nen and Die
Linke (Figure 13). The more convivial nature of the 18th Bundestag could be due to the
smaller size of the parliament, or the fact that the CDU/CSU held the overwhelming
majority of seats in the parliament, almost reaching an absolute majority, while the
SPD had taken on the role of a small coalition partner rather than one of the two
major parties due to poor election results.
Period 16 also has distinctly more Heiterkeit than Lachen, though it is less pro-
nounced than in period 18. Interestingly here, the amount of Heiterkeit both given and
received appears to almost exactly match the allocation of speaking time. In terms
of giving and receiving Lachen, the parties are also relatively even matched, with the
only difference being that the CDU/CSU receives proportionally more laughter while
B90/Die Gru¨nen receives less (Figure 11).
Hypothesis three states that the longer it takes to form a coalition, the more
Lachen there will be between the parties in the coalition and vice versa when it comes
to Heiterkeit. In terms of Lachen, Figure 15 does indeed show such a tendency, with
the amount of Lachen between the parties of the governing coalition increasing relative
to the time spent to form the coalition. Period 19 is the only exception. This could
be explained, however, by the arrival of the AfD in the Bundestag and the disruption
caused to behaviour along ‘traditional’ lines. As the AfD produces and receives a
hitherto unheard of amount of Lachen in the Bundestag, all other values become less
significant. In terms of Heiterkeit, the effect is less clear, but somewhat still present,
with period 18 providing the exception this time (Figure 16). The 18th period, however,
despite requiring the second longest amount of time to form a coalition, was marked by
an unusually high proportion of Heiterkeit. The only immediate reason for this could
lie in the uncommonly small number of parties present.
Hypothesis four departs from the fact that speaking time is allocated based on
the size of the party in the Bundestag. As laughter can be used as a non-verbal means
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of participating in the debate and navigating the strict rules in place, the smaller
parties are likely to laugh more often as a means of compensating for the difference in
speaking time. This is expected to be the case particularly for Lachen as Lachen shows
disagreement and opposition, while Heiterkeit is usually only a response to humorous
occurrences or a means of showing in-group consensus. This theory does hold up to
a certain extent, as can be seen from Figures 17-20, but there are perhaps also other
factors at play. Table 6 shows that in period 16, despite having the same amount of
speaking time, only Die Linke uses Lachen (61%) more than Heiterkeit (39%), while
B90/Die Gru¨nen, although still using a higher ratio of Lachen (42%) to Heiterkeit
(58%) than the four remaining parties, has a greater use of Heiterkeit. The FDP, on
the other hand, with only one minute more speaking time per hour than both Die Linke
and B90/Die Gru¨nen, laughs considerably less, though still more than the CDU/CSU
and SPD, which both have the same high amount of speaking time and similar levels of
Heiterkeit and Lachen. A reason for the differing levels of Lachen among the opposition
parties could lie in the distance they are from the ruling parties. Although both the
CDU/CSU and the SPD are in a coalition, the CDU/CSU scored minimally more
votes than the SPD and was able to elect a chancellor from among their ranks. This
could indicate slightly more power on their part and account for the increasing ratio of
Lachen to Heiterkeit that begins with the FDP and continues on to B90/Die Gru¨nen
and Die Linke as it moves further away from the CDU/CSU on the political spectrum.
In period 17, it does not seem to be speaking time so much as opposition status
that determines the amount of Lachen in contrast to the amount of Heiterkeit. Despite
having twice the amount of speaking time, the SPD uses Lachen (58%) in the same ratio
to Heiterkeit (42%) as B90/Die Gru¨nen. Die Linke also uses more Lachen (52%), but
not as much as the two other parties in opposition. Both the parties of the governing
coalition use similar levels of Lachen and Heiterkeit despite vastly differing speaking
times (Table 6).
Period 18 is a period characterised by Heiterkeit. The two governing parties use
very low frequencies of Lachen, while the two parties in opposition use comparatively
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more Lachen, but still less than Heiterkeit. This is again more likely due to their
outsider status, than to the speaking time allocated to them as the SPD receives close
to half the speaking time of the CDU/CSU, but nevertheless actually uses Lachen less
than the CDU/CSU (Figure 19 and Table 6).
Period 19 again somewhat bucks the trend, first and foremost with regard to the
AfD, which receives the third highest amount of speaking time, but nevertheless uses
Lachen more than any other party (77% of its total instances of laughter). What is
interesting in this period, however, is the amount of Lachen used by the SPD, which,
despite being part of the ruling coalition, uses Lachen (41%) considerably more than
the FDP (31%). Based on the above observations, this would place it among the
opposition with a black-yellow coalition in government (Table 6).
Looking at the use of Lachen and Heiterkeit across all periods, it can be seen in
Table 6 that the further a party lies outside of the political middle, the more likely its
instance of laughter is to be Lachen rather than Heiterkeit. However, being part of the
government is likely to lower the amount of Lachen used, as can be seen in the case
of the FDP, which actually has a lower ratio of Lachen to Heiterkeit than the SPD.
Perhaps this can be explained by its relative closeness with the CDU/CSU, which was,
throughout all periods in this study, the strongest party in the Bundestag.
Hypothesis five follows from Sebaldt’s (1995) study, which looked at the ways the
other parties reacted to the PDS when it entered the Bundestag for the first time in
1990 following the reunification of Germany. The PDS was a successor to the SED, the
ruling party of the former East Germany, which had been considered an anti-democratic
party. Sebaldt found that the PDS had been excluded, in particular by parties that
were furthest from it on the political spectrum, but that this exclusion waned over
time as the other parties became accustomed to the PDS’ presence in parliament.
Hypothesis five is therefore that Lachen aimed at the AfD will decrease over time
as the other parties begin to grow accustomed to its presence in the Bundestag and
perhaps learn to ignore its provocative tactics. The current study, however, does not
come to the same conclusions as Sebaldt with regard to the AfD (Figure 21). This
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could be due to the incomplete nature of the data as perhaps the parties still require
time to adjust to the presence of the AfD, which may come further towards the end of
the period. Sebaldt’s study, however, only covered 1991, the first full year of the 12th
Bundestag and this amount of time was sufficient to notice a decline in the amount of
verbal exclusion. The current study covers an even greater amount of time, looking
at transcripts covering almost two years from 24 October 2017 – 27 September 2019.
Perhaps the AfD’s more extreme position means that more time will be required for
the other parties to become accustomed to its presence, or that, alternatively, it may
never be fully be accepted in the Bundestag.
Hypothesis six looks at the strategies the other parties employ to deal with the
disruptive nature of the AfD. According to both Ruhose (2018) and Goodwin (2011),
strategies for dealing with extremist parties include not engaging with the party and
refusing to adopt its communication strategies. In order to see whether the other
parties in the Bundestag take this advice and remain neutral in the face of the AfD’s
disruptive tactics, or whether they, on the contrary, allow themselves to be provoked
could show what strategies they employ in parliament. Therefore the hypothesis states
that the other parties will laugh more to compensate for the AfD’s disruptive behaviour
or laugh less as a means of ignoring them. In terms of Lachen as an overall percentage of
the total instances of laughter, there is no real discernable difference between the 19th
period and the other periods in this study. Table 5 also does not show any significant
difference in the total amount of Lachen produced by the different parties as compared
to the other periods, even when keeping in mind that the 19th period is only more
or less halfway through. As the parties are very unlikely to laugh together with the
AfD (either Lachen or Heiterkeit) as shown in Table 14 where the correlations are all
negative, it can be surmised that the additional laughter in the 19th period is indeed
due to the AfD and not to an increase of laughter on the part of the other parties.
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7.1 Reflections
Although this study is unique in its scope and size, it does of course have its
limitations. First of all, human error cannot be ruled out, either during the data
collection, which was completed manually, or on the part of the stenographers who
are tasked with keeping track of everything that takes place inside the, at times very
disorderly, plenary chamber. In the present study, 16,000 observations were collected
by hand, noting the form of laughter, attributing its source to a party or parties and
recording the receiving party. Given the scope of the data, it would be foolhardy to
believe that, in spite of the care taken to ensure the accuracy of the collection, no errors
occurred during the notation, whether due to oversight, mistakes made in recording
the parties of the producer and recipient of the laughter, or omission.
Furthermore, complete accuracy cannot be expected on the part of the stenogra-
phers who are tasked with making split-second decisions as to the nature of the laughter,
designating it as either Lachen or Heiterkeit. Here, subjectivity may be an issue as
the stenographers are well aware of the party alliances at play and perhaps allow this
knowledge to sway their categorisation of the laughter. Furthermore, it is not always
possible for the stenographers to correctly attribute all noises—interjections, questions,
laughter, etc.—to all party members making them in a lively and busy chamber full of
MPs. That is why Mu¨ller (2011) recommends consulting the video recordings of the
speeches to gain additional contextual information. However, as the recordings are not
quite as accurate at attributing or even identifying verbal and non-verbal reactions in
the audience as the stenographic reports are, he suggests consulting both, rather than
relying on a single source (pp. 36-37). This is sound advice, but due to time con-
straints and the sheer volume of the data, it was unfortunately not within the realm
of possibility for the current study.
Moreover, as this study was purely quantitative, it lacks qualitative analysis. In
order to fully understand the use of laughter in the Bundestag and to find out whether
the different kinds of laughter do entirely achieve the roles assigned to them, it would
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be necessary to look at the context surrounding each instance to determine the nature
of the laughter based on a set of pre-defined criteria. For example, MPs sometimes use
Lachen towards their own party members. This could be construed as tension within
the party, but closer analysis often shows that it is actually due to the fact that the
speaking MP is quoting an MP from another opposing party and that the derisive
laughter is actually targeted towards the opposition. Therefore, the stenographer is
correct in defining the laughter as Lachen, but attributing the recipient based purely
on the MP speaking can sometimes lead to inaccurate representations of laughter.
Taking into account not only the immediate context, but the broader context as
well would furthermore play an important role in understanding the use of humour in
the German Bundestag, especially when comparing election periods. More Lachen in
certain periods compared to others may not only signal unrest among the parties, but
could also be influenced by external factors such as the introduction of divisive topics
in the Bundestag or within the community at large (for example, a cursory look at
some of the more unruly debates shows that topics such as immigration and gender
equality seem to have led to a lot of dispute and hence an increased amount of Lachen
in the current study). The study could also only stand to profit from the inclusion of
further disciplines including from political studies and cultural studies.
7.2 Outlook
The current study provides a first step in understanding the use of laughter in
the German Bundestag using data spanning almost four electoral periods and close to
fourteen years. The data, analysis and results gathered within could provide a sturdy
basis for further research that may extend in many directions.
First, a more historical study that looks at data from even more electoral periods
could be of great interest, not least because it would provide further evidence for or
against some of the hypotheses posited in this work. For example, in period 17 the
amount of Lachen was found to almost surpass that of Heiterkeit. This, according to
hypothesis two, should indicate a higher level of conflict between the different parties
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or alliances. Here, it was speculated that the higher level of Lachen was perhaps due
to the return to traditional party lines, i.e. the coalition between the CDU/CSU and
the FDP with the SPD reprising its place among the opposition. As the other three
periods in this study all exceptionally involve grand coalitions, no other ‘traditional’
formations could be studied to ascertain whether this is truly the case, or whether the
causes are exogenous, i.e. due to the tense political situation that reigned at the time.
It would therefore be of great interest to conduct a similar study, but with a wider
scope, or merely focused on periods with similar party constellations.
Furthermore, perhaps the most exceptional and disruptive developments took place
in the 19th Bundestag. Here it would be interesting to follow the evolution of the
political arena to determine exactly what tactics the other parties employ to deal with
the presence of the AfD in parliament. This study was unable to find any changes
in the ways the other parties interacted with the AfD in the first two years of the
electoral term, but hypothesises that this will perhaps come later as the AfD and the
other parties find their places in the new political landscape. The literature provides
several means for dealing with extremist parties, ranging from excluding and ignoring
the extremist party; adopting some of the extremist party’s stances and behaviours;
and even creating loose alliances with the extremist party. Here it would be interesting
in a first step to follow the use of laughter through to the end of the 19th period and,
based on prognoses for the future that predict that the AfD will not be leaving the
Bundestag any time soon, over the course of further electoral periods. As the entry of
the PDS (now known as Die Linke) in parliament in 1990 also caused disruption, it
would be interesting to compare the evolution of the reception of the PDS/Die Linke
in the Bundestag with the evolution of the reception of the AfD to see if there are any
similarities between the two.
The addition of a further layer or further layers of data could also add more depth
to the study. These include a qualitative step in addition to the quantitative analy-
sis whereby the instances of laughter are further assigned categories beyond the mere
Lachen/Heiterkeit distinction made by the stenographers. These categories could in-
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clude ironic laughter, the use of which, as mentioned above, may have slightly skewed
the data in the present study, as well as non-political laughter and targeted laughter.
Also interesting to the analysis could be the attribution of laughter to single MPs or
entire parties. This was left out of the current study as only party attribution was
noted. For example, one single MP may be particularly raucous, making it appear
that the entire party laughs a lot. Looking at the debate topics would also provide
further contextual information and an idea of whether some topics may be off limits
when it comes to laughter or whether others incite above average amounts of laughter.
On a broader scale, further details relating to the general political situation including
current issues and crises could also add extra depth to the study.
Finally, it could be interesting to implement an intercultural study in order to see
whether laughter is used in a similar way in other parliamentary contexts. However,
the greatest challenge facing an intercultural study of this nature would not only lie
in finding parliamentary transcripts that differentiate between different kinds of inter-
jections (the British parliament, for example, marks any and all interruptions merely
as ‘interruption’ irrespective of their nature) and note the use of laughter, but also to
find transcripts that differentiate between the various forms of laughter. Should this
be possible, however, there is still no guarantee that the categorisations of laughter
would correspond with one another.
8 Conclusion
This study investigated the use of laughter as a non-verbal means of political com-
munication by examining the ways in which the different forms of laughter as distin-
guished in the written transcripts of the German Bundestag can be used to understand
the dynamics of any given electoral period. Drawing on theory from discourse analysis,
humour studies and linguistics, it found that laughter can play two main roles in the
Bundestag, namely that of inclusion and exclusion, which are noted by stenographers
as Heiterkeit and Lachen respectively.
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Discourse analysis has grown over the years to include more than just verbal lan-
guage, recognising the important role that non-verbal elements also play as carriers
of meaning in communication. As there are strict regulations governing the ways in
which politicians interact with one another in the Bundestag, MPs are forced to find
new and creative ways to bypass these rules and have their message heard. These strict
regulations, coupled with the sometimes parsimonious allocation of speaking time as
well as the changing nature of the plenary discussions and the increasing importance
placed on the viewing public rather than the other MPs present in the plenary cham-
ber have all led to an increase in the use of non-traditional elements of debate such as
interjections, interruptions and laughter. Finally, the entry of the AfD in the German
Bundestag in 2017 appears to have completely disrupted previously held concepts of
‘normal’ behaviour in parliament.
This study found that the use of Lachen and Heiterkeit can indeed be used to
determine party alliances, both current and traditional, as well as the general ‘mood’
of the electoral period, which tends to decline as the use of Lachen increases. It was also
found that Lachen can be used by smaller parties to compensate for the lower amount
of speaking time allocated to them and still have their opinion heard. The amount of
Lachen used between the two parties constituting the government can also be taken as
a relative indicator of the amount of time the parties took to form a coalition. There
is, however, one exception to all these observations: the AfD and, by extension, the
19th Bundestag. Here, all previously observed norms of behaviour were cast aside,
with the line between government and opposition blurring and instead making way
for a distinction between AfD and not-AfD. Although it was predicted that the other
parties would begin to accommodate the AfD as the period continued, this could not
be confirmed in the data.
Despite its scope, or perhaps because of it, this study is not without its limitations.
As it is a purely quantitative analysis of the use of laughter in the Bundestag, it lacks a
qualitative aspect that could provide more accurate and in-depth insights into the data
and correct any mistakes made in categorising the laughter as Lachen or Heiterkeit.
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The addition of further categories of analysis could perhaps help to better understand
when and how laughter is used in parliament.
Nevertheless, this study provides a solid first step in understanding how non-verbal
communication and, in particular, laughter (and by extension, humour) is used as a
means of political communication in the German Bundestag.
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